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Chapter 1: Background to the Study  
1.1. Background 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) imposes a complex system of rights and 
obligations upon its members. With 159 parties at present and its ample coverage of 
almost all aspects of international trade its importance is manifest.
1
 Although much 
academic writing has been undertaken with regard to a wide number of trade aspects 
arising from the WTO agreements, the understanding of the legal nature of its 
obligations is still far from being finally resolved.
2
 Examining the legal nature of WTO 
obligations aims at answering the question whether these norms are bilateral or 
collective in nature. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
In public international law, a number of consequences follow from the distinction of 
bilateral and collective norms. This distinction is reflected in international treaties, first 
and foremost the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the 
International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ASR)
3
 concerning questions such as modification of treaties, legal 
standing and the right to countermeasures.
4
  
 
Bilateral or reciprocal norms can be described as norms that are only determinative in 
the bilateral relationship between two parties, usually in a bilateral treaty.
5
 Yet, it has 
been found that also in multilateral treaties norms can be of a bilateral nature. The 
multilateral treaty is then to be regarded as an agreement consisting of a bundle of 
bilateral relationships. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a treaty with 
187 member states, is referred to as a prime example of a multilateral treaty with 
                                                          
1
 Solanski GA ‘Globalization and the Role of WTO in Promoting Free International Trade’ (2012) 3 
JHSS11  11-13. 
2
 Carmody C ‘WTO Obligations as Collective’ (2006) 17 EJIL 419 419-420 (hereinafter Carmody WTO 
Obligations as Collective).  
3
 Their codification of customary law is not accepted with regard to all articles but they were nevertheless 
adopted by the General Assembly in 2001, UN GA Res 56/83 (12 December 2001). 
4
 Pauwelyn J ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or 
Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907 908-909 (hereinafter Pauwelyn A Typology). 
5
 Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Gerald Fitzmaurice UN Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958) II YILC 20 27 
(hereinafter Fitzmaurice Third Report).  
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bilateral obligations.
6
 A violation of any of the rules only infringes the State directly 
affected by the breach, but not the interest of other member states.  
 
Collective norms can be described as norms that express a common interest of the 
member states.
7
 Two categories need to be distinguished. First, there are interdependent 
norms, in which case the performance of all member states are tied together in the sense 
that a violation leads to all member states of the treaty being injured in case of a 
violation. Generally, this is the case with regard to disarmament treaties, as all the 
parties solely want to perform their obligations under the treaty if all other member 
states also actually perform their obligations.
8
  
 
Secondly, there are collective norms with an erga omnes character meaning that those 
obligations are owed towards the community as a whole
9
 or with regard to erga omnes 
partes norms towards all parties to a certain treaty. The consequences that follow from 
considering an obligation as having erga omnes (partes) character are less clear. Yet, all 
other (member) states are seen as to having an interest in the adherence of the 
obligation. The concept was first developed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and erga omnes norms in public international law include inter alia the prohibition on 
genocide and slavery as well as basic human rights.
10
  
 
The distinction is not only important to understand particular aspects of a treaty but also 
help in the overall understanding of a treaty. The WTO agreements, although in many 
aspects regarded as lex specialis,
11
 were agreed among states on the international level 
making it reasonable and indeed essential to draw from categories found in general 
international public law in order to determine the legal nature of these obligations.
12
 
                                                          
6
 Pauwelyn referring to Fitzmaurice A Typology (2003) 911; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Merits) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 33 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction]; 
whether this holds true even today can be disputed see infra 3.3.1.  
7
 Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Gerald Fitzmaurice UN Doc. A/CN.4/107(1957) II YILC 16 
54 (hereinafter Fitzmaurice Second Report).  
8
 Fitzmaurice Second Report (1957) 54.  
9
 Fitzmaurice Second Report (1957) 54.  
10
 Barcelona Traction (1970) 33.  
11
 In the sense of Art. 5 and 55 ASR. 
12
 See for the discussion of WTO as part of the wider framework of public international law instead of 
many Simma B & Pulkowski D ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International 
Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483 483-484.  
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Thus, the question arises where to place the obligations of the WTO agreements? Are 
they bilateral because trade is generally between two states? Or is the international 
trading system expression of a common interest of the parties to create a rule based and 
fair common market place with the agreements reflecting the balance of interests of the 
parties? Does the latter thought justify regarding the norms as having an erga omnes 
character with the consequence that in case of a violation by one member state every 
member state should be in the position to enforce the rules?  
 
Answering these questions will help to better understand the WTO system and will be 
crucial in several regards, especially with regard to enforcement, i.e. which member 
state or states have an interest in a dispute settlement procedure (legal standing)
13
 and 
the right to countermeasures.
14
 Furthermore, a theoretical understanding of the nature of 
obligations might enable a better understanding of the WTO in the wider framework of 
public international law. Hence, in case the WTO agreements are silent on certain 
aspects, Panels and the Appellate Body might and indeed already did so in the past refer 
to general international public law, such as the VCLT and the ASR making it necessary 
to determine which set of norms are applicable to the respective WTO norms.
15
  
 
1.3. Research Question 
The aim of this research is to answer the question whether WTO obligations are 
bilateral or collective in nature. Not all WTO obligations feature the same 
characteristics. While some WTO norms tend to lead towards an understanding as 
norms erga omnes partes;
16
 other norms can rather be seen as to define a bilateral 
                                                          
13
 The lack of a doctrine of legal standing before the DSB was heavily criticised by Bustamante R ‘The 
Need for a GATT Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the United States Cannot Stand the European 
Community’s Banana Import Regime’ (1997) 6 MJGT 532-584 (hereinafter GATT Doctrine of Locus 
Standi).  
14
 In favor of multilateralising the enforcement of WTO obligations see Yenkong NH ‘Collective 
Countermeasures and the WTO Dispute Settlement: ‘Solidarity Measures Revisited’ (2004) 2 NJCL 1-16.  
15
 J & Gray KR ‘Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 
248-298.  
16
 This has been explicitly stated by the Arbitrator in the arbitration under Article 22(6) in United States – 
Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”: “Art. 3 SCM is an erga omnes obligation owed in its 
entirety to each and every Member. It cannot be considered to be ‘allocatable’ across the Membership. 
Otherwise, the Member concerned would be only partially obliged in respect of each and every, which is 
manifestly inconsistent with an erga omnes per se obligation.” (US v. EC) (2002) (Art. 22(6) Arbitration) 
WT/DS108/ARB para 6.10 [hereinafter US – FSC].  
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relationship. A consistent approach needs to be developed in order to be able to 
determine the legal nature of obligations in international law in general and a thorough 
norm-by-norm examination is necessary to determine the legal nature of WTO 
obligations in particular.  
 
1.4. Objective and significance of the study  
The objective of the study is to gain a deeper and better understanding of the WTO 
agreements in their entirety. The significance lies in the fact that once the nature of 
obligations of WTO norms is better understood, this may answer a number of questions 
with regard to several aspects of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) proceedings, 
especially legal standing and the right to countermeasures but also with regard to 
modification of obligations when a limited number of member states enter into Regional 
Trade Agreements thereby opting out from certain WTO rules. In a number of cases the 
Panel, AB or Arbitrators have referred to general international public law such as the 
ILC ARS, making it necessary to determine which norms are to be applied in case of 
lacunae.
17
 
 
The potential impact could further be seen in the possibility that, if WTO norms were 
found to be of a collective nature, powerful states could take up the interest of less 
powerful states when being allowed to enforce norms that were breached but are 
otherwise not being brought to the attention of the DSB. If WTO norms are indeed not 
only of bilateral character but of a collective nature other states could enforce WTO 
norms without being directly affected by the violation.
18
 This could be of particular 
importance for developing and least developed countries that often due to a number of 
reasons, i.e. lack of power or resources, do not approach the DSB. In fact, no African 
countries has as of now participated in a DSB proceeding as complainant.
19
  
                                                          
17
 E.g. US – FSC (2002) (Art. 22.6), 5.58; Brazil –  Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil v. 
Canada) (2000) (Article 22.6 — Brazil) WT/DS35/ARB para. 8.171. 
18
 Posner EA ‘Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, And Constitutionalism in International Law’ 
(2008) Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 224 8 arguing that erga omnes norms generally increase 
the level of enforcement (available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html last accessed 
30.03.2013); contary Stremnitzer A ‘Erga Omnes Norms and the Enforcement of International Law’ 
(2009) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 29 31-32.  
19
 However, Benin and Chad argued that their interests should be taken into account in the proceedings 
between USA and Brazil due to the special role of developing countries in WTO which leads to the 
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1.5. Literature review  
Hitherto, only a limited number of authors have substantially approached the question 
of the nature of WTO obligations. Notwithstanding, they arrived at quite opposing 
results. In a nutshell, Pauwelyn argues that trade is invariably between two states 
resulting in the WTO norms being of an exclusively bilateral character.
20
 Carmody, on 
the other hand, proposed that WTO norms are in general of a collective nature as 
‘[T]heir principal objective is the protection of collective expectations about the trade-
related behaviour of governments’.21 In his opinion, ‘[T]he rules serve the common 
interest over and above the interest of WTO Member States individually’.22 Gazzini 
appears to agree with Pauwelyn with regard to the overall understating of the WTO 
obligations. However, he distinguishes between different norms and finds at least with 
regard to some rules that erga omnes effects have been extended to these norms, such as 
Art. 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) intro or Art. 
XXIII(1) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
23
  
 
Yet, others have viewed this question from a slightly different angle, examining 
whether the WTO agreements are rather contractual or constitutional in nature.
24
 The 
discussion overlap with regard to the question what the underlying purpose of the WTO 
agreements is and whether the WTO and its agreement are of a higher hierarchical order 
superseding other agreements. The constitutional approach concludes that the WTO 
system of rights and obligations is collective and thus beyond the discretion of the 
individual member states establishing a legal order in which WTO obligations trump 
other legal obligations. From these obligations it cannot be derogated from by way of a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
question under what conditions Member States should be allowed to make claims on behalf of other 
Member States, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US v. Brazil) (2004) WT/DS267/R para. 
7.1409 [hereinafter US – Upland Cotton].  
20
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 907-951.  
21
 Carmody WTO Obligations as Collective (2006) 419.  
22
 Carmody WTO Obligations as Collective (2006) 419.  
23
 Gazzini T ‘The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences of their Violation’ (2006) 17 
EJIL 723-742 [hereinafter Gazzini The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations].  
24
 Cass DZ ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the 
Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 EJIL 39-75 [hereinafter Cass 
Constitutionalization of International Trade Law]; Dunoff JL ‘Constiutional Conceits: The WTOs 
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 647-675 [hereinafter Dunoff The 
WTO’s Constitution]; Petersmann E-U The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, 
International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement System (1997) [hereinafter Petersmann 
GATT/WTO].  
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separate agreement among a limited number of member states.
25
 The contractual 
approach argues that the WTO lacks constitutional features and is thus a bundle of 
bilateral agreements that permits member states to derogate from it.
26
  
 
This study will examine the different arguments and aims to uncover some of the 
shortcomings of the approaches brought forward so far. It will try to interlink the 
‘contractual/constitutional’ as well as the ‘nature of obligation’ discussions in a 
comprehensive way. Although there tends be a common understanding that a norm-by-
norm approach might be most appropriate, the author finds that the answers presented 
so far did not develop a set of overall criteria that could help in determining the 
character of each and every specific norm. Therefore, the author will present a three step 
approach in order to determine legal obligations in international law in general and 
WTO obligations in particular. This test will be applied to a number of distinct and 
central WTO obligations.  
 
1.6. Methodology  
This is mainly a desktop study. It analyses the primary sources of WTO law, such as 
treaty texts, ministerial declarations and findings of the DSB as well as secondary 
sources, especially academic writing. It will draw on the rules that in general 
international law reflect the understanding of bilateral and collective obligations, 
namely the VCLT or the ASR. These two texts lay the ground for the distinction with 
regard to generally understanding the system of treaties in international law as well the 
responsibility of states in international law. The study will carefully analyze their 
meaning and the incorporation of this understanding with regard to the WTO.  
 
1.7. Limitations of the study  
Although it might turn out that different norms might have a different legal nature, this 
study will not be able to examine each and every provision of the many WTO 
                                                          
25
 Langille J ‘Neither Constitution Nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by Examining the Legal Limits 
On Contracting Out Through Regional Trade Agreements’ (2011) 86 NYULR 1482 1493 [hereinafter 
Langille Neither Constitution Nor Contract]. 
26
 Langille Neither Constitution Nor Contract 1494-1497. 
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agreements. Rather, paradigmatic core norms will be looked at in greater detail in order 
to arrive at a proposal which can guide the characterisation of a WTO norm as bilateral 
or collective.  
 
1.8. Chapterization  
Chapter Two 
The second Chapter will examine the differentiation between bilateral and collective 
obligations in general public international law. It will research on the historical 
development starting with the judgments of the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ) and 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Genocide Case, the Barcelona Traction 
Case and the East Timor Case. It will further study the different categories in the VCLT 
and the ASR. A better understanding of the concept of bilateral and collective 
obligations in international law will be necessary in order to being able to apply those 
categories to the WTO agreements.  
 
Chapter Three  
Chapter Three will analyse the right approach for the determination of the legal nature 
of WTO obligations. It will critically discuss the different existing approaches brought 
forward in legal academic writings so far, identify shortcomings and propose a distinct 
and pragmatic approach. It will present a catalogue of aspects that would generally 
enable categorizing the different norms of the WTO agreements.  
 
Chapter Four 
Chapter Four will apply the three step approach developed above to the WTO. It will 
examine the object and purpose of the WTO agreements, the procedural design and 
determine the legal nature of core obligations of the WTO agreements.  
    
4. Chapter Five 
Chapter Five will conclude the study.  
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Chapter 2: Distinction and consequences of the nature of obligations in 
public international law 
2.1. Introduction 
It is believed that international law as cooperation between states or state-like entities 
most probably started with simple trade agreements.
27
 These agreements were usually 
concluded on a bilateral level and defined the relationship between two states. The idea 
of an international community only appeared much later and its first indications can be 
traced back to the 17
th 
century with the famous peace treaties of Westphalia, when states 
stroke for a balance of power.
28
 However, only in the 19
th
 century states began to 
develop international treaties in which general rules were laid out such as the 
Declaration of Paris regarding the freedom of the sea (1856) or the General Act of the 
Brussels Conference in 1890 that established an International Maritime Office.
29
  
 
A new era of international law began after the First World War when states started 
cooperating by and large on an international level, first and foremost by establishing the 
League of Nations which would later develop into the United Nations (UN).
30
 It is also 
after the Second World War that multilateral treaties were agreed among states on a 
large scale and most importantly the International Law Commission (ILC) began its 
work on the codification of international law. The shift in international law from a law 
reflecting the individual interest of states towards a community that protects certain 
communal interests goes hand in hand with the protection of communal goods and the 
deeper integration and globalisation encompassing almost all aspects of international 
cooperation.
31
  
 
                                                          
27
 Neff CS A Short History of International law in Evans MD (ed.) International Law 2eds (2003) 
(available at: http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199565665/evans3e_ch01.pdf) [hereinafter Neff A 
Short History]. 
28
 Neff A Short History (2003) 12. 
29
 Neff A Short History (2003) 20.  
30
 Neff A Short History (2003) 25. 
31
 Villalpando S The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests Are 
Protected in International Law (2010) 21 EJIL 387 390-394. 
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With the further development of international law came the distinction between bilateral 
and collective obligations. While the former category still reflects the bilateral relation 
between two states the latter category pays tribute to the development of an 
international community and the protection of collective interests in international law. 
This development was reflected in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the work especially of 
Gerald Fitzmaurice as Special Rapporteur for the ILC,
32
  as well as inter alia in the 
VCLT and the ASR. Both documents are mainly codifications of customary law with 
regard to a number of aspects of international treaties as well as the responsibilities of 
states. Although both texts foresee the possibility that treaties contain lex specialis,
33
 
they stipulate general rules in case no such lex specialis was created by parties to an 
international treaty. They can thus largely be seen to reflect customary law with regard 
to the understanding of bilateral and collective obligations in international law.  
 
Although the WTO might indeed in many regards be of special nature, the world trade 
regime is still part of the wider framework of public international law.
34
 Thus, general 
international public law is relevant also for understanding the WTO agreements, making 
it relevant to better understand the nature of obligations in general international public 
law.
35
 It is well known that WTO agreements do not exist in ‘clinical isolation’ from the 
rest of international public law.
36
 It was the work of Pauwelyn who again drew the 
attention on the distinction between bilateral and collective obligations in international 
public law and raised the question whether WTO obligations are rather bilateral or 
collective in nature.
37
  
 
                                                          
32
 Especially Fitzmaurice Second Report (1957) and Third Report (1958).  
33
 Art. 5 VCLT, Art. 55 ASR. 
34
 Simma & Pulkowski Of Planets and the Universe (2006) 519-523. 
35
 Cf. Van den Bosche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials (2005) 60-65; Pauwelyn J ‘Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law’ (2003) 25-88; McRae D ‘The WTO in International Law: 
Tradition Continued or New Frontier?’ (2000) 3 JIEL 27 27-41; Petersmann E-U ‘Dispute Settlement in 
International Economic Law – Lessons for the Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-
Economic Areas’ (1999) 2 JIEL 189-248; Palmeter D & Mavroidis PC ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources 
of Law’ (1998) 92 AJIL 398-413; Shadikhodjaev S & Park N ‘Cessation and Reparation in the 
GATT/WTO Legal System: A View from the Law of State Responsibility’ (2007) 41 JWT 1237 1238. 
36
 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela) (1996) WT/DS2/Ab/R 17 [hereinafter US – Gasoline]; Lamy P ‘The Place of the WTO and Its 
Laws in the International Legal Order’ (2007) 17 EJIL 969 972. 
37
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 907-951.  
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After a general introduction about the distinction between bilateral and collective 
obligations, the consequences of both categories can best be studied when examining 
different aspects regarding altering and enforcing treaty obligations as reflected in the 
VCLT, the ASR as well as the corresponding jurisprudence of the ICJ.  
 
2.2. The differentiation between bilateral and collective obligations 
The travaux préparatoires of the ILC to the VCLT was heavily influenced by the work 
of its first Special Rapporteur Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who explicitly introduced the 
distinction between bilateral and collective obligations into public international law.
38
  
 
Bilateral obligations define the relationship between two parties and obviously appear in 
a bilateral treaty. Yet, also a multilateral treaty may be comprised of bilateral 
obligations. In this regard, Fitzmaurice clarified that the number of parties to a contract 
is not determinative of the nature of its obligations.
39
 He described bilateral or 
‘reciprocal’ obligations as obligations that express ‘a mutual interchange of benefits 
between the parties’.40 In a multilateral treaty this can be described as a bundle of 
bilateral relations.
41
  
 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is referred to as a multilateral treaty 
consisting of bilateral obligations.
42
 Although the Convention today counts more than 
186 ratifications,
43
 the particular obligation only arises towards another member state 
individually in the respective bilateral relationship.
44
 The violation of diplomatic rights, 
e.g. of a Zambian diplomat in Germany infringes the bilateral relation between the two 
states. Obviously Zambia may enforce its rights against Germany. However, this 
                                                          
38
 Fitzmaurice Third Report (1958) 27.  
39
 Fitzmaurice Second Report (1957) 20.  
40
 Fitzmaurice Third Report (1958) 27.  
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 911.  
43
 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) 500 UNTS 95; member states 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en (last accessed 
29.03.2013).  
44
 At least traditionally the obligations were seen as bilateral Hilgruber C ‘The Right of Third States to 
Take Countermeasures’ in Tomuschat C & Thouvenin JM (eds) The Fundamental Rules of The 
International Lega Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (2006) 265 282 [hereinafter 
Hilgruber The Right of Third States].  
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violation would not give say France a right to enforce the rights of Zambia against 
Germany.  
 
Alongside, there exists a second category in a multilateral treaty, namely obligations 
that are of a collective nature. These collective obligations create different consequences 
for the member states as they do not define a bilateral relationship but rather protect a 
common interest of the parties. Fitzmaurice described these obligations as “self-
existent, absolute and inherent for each party”.45 Two categories of collective 
obligations need to be distinguished.  
 
The first subcategory of collective obligations is so called interdependent obligations. 
Fitzmaurice observed that collective obligations can be tied together in a sense that the 
compliance of all the parties is required in order to live up to the interest of all the 
parties. As an example it is usually referred to disarmament agreements that require all 
parties to demobilize their weapon arsenal.
46
 It is the aim of the members that in the end 
really all parties are in the same way defenceless.
47
 If only one party actually fails to 
reduce its armoury all the other parties may lose their interest in the contract as this 
upsets the object and purpose of the entire treaty.
48
 In this regard, although a multilateral 
treaty, these treaties are more comparable to bilateral treaties in the sense that the 
obligations are owed to each and every other member state individually and failure to 
comply with an obligation thus upsets the interests of each and every state. 
Consequently, in case of violation every member is to be regarded an injured state in its 
individual capacity.  
 
The other subcategory of collective obligations is so called erga omnes obligations. 
These obligations protect a collective interest of the parties. Although not every party 
                                                          
45
 Fitzmaurice Third Report (1958) 28.  
46
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 912. 
47
 Fitzmaurice Second Report (1957) 31. 
48
 According to Article 60 VCLT a material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles (c) 
any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of 
the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach 
of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further 
performance of its obligations under the treaty. A material breach may be found, for the purpose of this 
article, if the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the 
treaty (Art. 60, para 3(b)).  
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might be injured in case of their violation all parties – due to the fact that the obligation 
protects the collective interest and not only individual interest – have an interest that the 
obligations are adhered to and in case of violation can be enforced. It has been identified 
as a problem that ‘omnes’ – apart from it being a Latin phrase and thus by its very 
nature not clear at first sight – may “either refer to all others collectively, or to each of 
the others individually”.49  
Erga omnes and erga omnes partes norms were very precisely defined by the Institute de 
Droit International as  
“(a) An obligation under general international law that a State owes in any given 
case to the international community, in view of its common values and its 
concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to 
take action; or 
(b) An obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes 
in any given case to all the other States parties to the same treaty, in view of 
their common values and concern for compliance, so that a breach of that 
obligation enables all these States to take action
.”50
 
 
The definition reveals that erga omnes obligations may appear in general international 
law as well as subsections concerned with particular aspects of international relations. 
While the former are obligations owed to the community as a whole, the latter are 
obligations owed towards all members of a treaty, thus also referred to as erga omnes 
partes or erga omnes contractantes.
51
 It should be noted already at this point that WTO 
obligations, as part of a treaty with a wide but still limited number of member states 
would – if at all – be erga omnes partes obligations.  
 
                                                          
49
 Tams CJ Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) 101 (hereinafter Tams Erga 
Omnes).  
50
 Obligations and Rights Erga Omnes in International Law, Institut de Droit International, the Krakow 
Session, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (2005) Article 1. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (4th 
Report 1992) Yearbook vol. II Part one 34 para. 92 stating that “[t]his legal structure [obligations erga 
omnes] is typical not only of peremptory norms, but also of other norms of general international law and 
of a number of multilateral treaty rules (erga omnes partes obligations)”. 
51
 According to Tams this category was first expressly introduced by the ICTY in the Blaskic´ case, 110 
ILR 699–700 (para. 26) Erga Omnes (2005) 119. 
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The consequences that follow from erga omnes (partes) obligations are much debated.
52
 
It is clear that the concept of erga omnes means more than the mere applicability of a 
norm between all member states to a treaty but rather refers to the secondary rules 
governing the effects in case of violation.
53
 To put it differently, the main question is 
what rights follow for the other states in case of violation of an erga omnes obligation 
which will be discussed in conjunction with the VCLT and ASR.
54
  
  
2.3. The VCLT: Admissibility of altering treaty obligations 
The VCLT is among other aspects concerned with the alteration of treaty obligations. 
When multilateral treaties are concluded member states often wish to adjust treaty 
obligations to their particular will, either by way of declaring reservations or by 
subsequently entering into other, differing agreements. In case of breach by another 
member state they may lose their interest in the contract, wishing to either suspend or 
terminate the treaty.
55
 
 
2.3.1. Reservation to a treaty 
The identification of a collective interest in international treaties was first expressly 
formulated by the ICJ in its Advisory opinion on Reservations
56
 to the Convention on 
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in 1951 (hereinafter Genocide 
Convention).
57
 With regard to the question what kind of reservations can be declared to 
the Genocide Convention, the ICJ pointed out that the object and purpose of the treaty is 
the main aspect for its admissibility.  
“In such a Convention the contracting states do not have any interests of their 
own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the 
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of 
                                                          
52
 See only the number of seperate and dissenting opinions following ICJ Belgium v. Senegal.  
53
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 102.  
54
 See infra 2.3 and 2.4. 
55
 See Art. 54-64 VCLT. 
56
 Art. 2 (d) VCLT:“’Reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a 
State, when signing, ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to vary the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”.  
57
 Reservations to the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Advisory 
opinion) [1951] ICJ Reports 15 [hereinafter Genocide Convention Case].  
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individual advantages to states, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual 
balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the 
Convention provide by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation 
and measure of all its provisions.”58 
Taking into consideration the underlying object and purpose of the convention, the ICJ 
argued that the parties are not free to choose which ever reservation it may please them. 
Rather, the Genocide Convention serves the collective interest of all states and cannot 
be divided into bilateral obligations owed to each and every member state individually. 
The parties agree on a certain behaviour, which is not to the discretion of the member 
state, restricting the possibility to declare reservations if they are not compatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty. The rules regarding reservations in the VCLT 
stipulate that generally reservations may be allowed by the treaty or otherwise need to 
be in conformity with the object and purpose of the treaty thereby reflecting the ICJs 
jurisprudence.
59
  
 
More problematic is the aspect of acceptance of the reservation by other member states; 
a point not yet resolved by the ICJ. According to Art. 20 (1) VCLT if the reservation is 
expressly authorized by a treaty such reservation does not require the acceptance of the 
other parties.
60
 Yet, if this is not the case the question which state has to accept the 
reservation and what consequences follow if only some states accept the reservation 
while others do not is of much debate.
61
 Article 20 (2) VCLT states that  
‘when it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object 
and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between 
all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each and one to be 
bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance of all the parties’.62  
 
This rule mirrors Fitzmaurice’ understanding that collective interests may be dependent 
on each other in a way that all parties have to make a decision concerning reservation to 
                                                          
58
 Genocide Convention Case (1951) 51.  
59
 Art. 19 VCLT.  
60
 Art. 20.1 VCLT. 
61
 See instead of many Tomuschat C ‘Admissability and Legal Effects of Reservations to Multilateral 
Treaties’ (1967) 27 ZaöRV 463-482 and Hylton DN ‘Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties’ Inadequate Framework on Reservations (1994) 27 Vand J Transnat’l L 419-451.  
62
 Art. 20.2 VCLT. 
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any treaty obligation. Only if the contract contains bilateral obligations may states by 
way of acceptance have differing obligations towards each other as it is the case with 
regard to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Different member states 
made different reservations that were accepted by some members and not accepted by 
others leading to differently defined relations between the respective pairs of states.
63
 
Contrary, in case of collective obligations the reservation needs to be accepted by all the 
parties.  
 
2.3.2. Modification of treaties 
The distinction of bilateral and collective obligations is also reflected in the rules 
governing the modification of treaties, part IV of the VCLT. Obviously a treaty may be 
amended by agreement of the parties, may it be with regard to a bilateral or a 
multilateral treaty.
64
 However, the question is whether a multilateral treaty may also be 
amended by a limited number of member states only.  
 
This is possible if the treaty expressly allows for it.
65
 Yet, according to Article 41(b) 
VCLT, modification is also possible if it is not prohibited and does not affect the 
enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their 
obligations and does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible 
with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.
66
  
 
                                                          
63
 http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en. 
64
 Article 39 and 40 VCLT.  
65
 Article 41(a) VCLT.  
66
 Article 41 VCLT reads: Article 41 Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the 
parties only  
1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as 
between themselves alone if:  
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or  
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and:  
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of 
their obligations;  
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of 
the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.  
2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1 (a) the treaty otherwise provides, the parties in question shall 
notify the other parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification to the treaty 
for which it provides. 
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From this provision it can be inferred that if obligations are purely bilateral, member 
states are allowed to bilaterally modify treaty obligations between them, as it may 
please them. This is due to the fact that other member states can, as a matter of fact, not 
be affected by the modification of the rights and obligations of the other two member 
states. This explains why e.g. the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which is 
understood as a treaty containing of bilateral obligations, provides in Art. 71(2) that 
“nothing shall preclude States from concluding international agreements confirming or 
supplementing or extending or amplifying the provision thereof”.67 The parties are thus 
free to modify their bilateral consular relations.  
 
The second paragraph however indicates that collective obligations may only be 
modified if this does not impair with the object and purpose of the contract and/or does 
not upset the interest of other member states.
68
 The consequence is that interdependent 
collective norms cannot be modified by a number of parties as this would affect the 
interests of the member states as foreseen by Article 41(b) (ii) VCLT. Even more, it is 
thus never possible to bilaterally alter a norm with erga omnes (partes) character if it is 
not in conformity with the object and purpose as automatically the interests of all 
member states are at stake.
69
 
 
2.3.3. Suspension and termination 
Suspension and termination of treaty obligations are very similarly regulated. The 
VCLT distinguishes between suspension of treaty obligations by way of agreement or 
as reaction of a breach by another member state. Both provisions, Art. 58 and Art. 60 
discern between bilateral and multilateral treaties.  
 
Regarding multilateral treaties the suspension of treaty obligations by way of agreement 
by a limited number of member states is only possible if this does not affect the 
enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their 
obligations and is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Regarding 
                                                          
67
 Art. 71(2) Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967) 596 UNTS 261.  
68
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 914.  
69
 Pauwelyn A Typology (2003) 914.  
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the possibility to react to the breach of another member state by way of terminating 
treaty obligations, according to Art. 60(2) (b) VCLT this is only possible for the party 
specifically affected by the breach. Any party not specifically affected by the breach 
may only invoke the responsibility as a ground for termination “if the treaty is of such a 
character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the 
position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under 
the treaty”, Art. 60 (2) (c) VCLT.  
 
This provision again reflects Fitzmaurice’s distinction between bilateral obligations and 
interdependent obligations. Only with regard to interdependent obligations may a 
violation be of such severity as to bring all member states of a multilateral treaty into 
the position to terminate their treaty obligation.
70
 However, there are no provisions on 
erga omnes obligations. Generally, the violation of an erga omnes obligation leaves the 
obligations of other states unaffected and does not entitle them to suspending their 
obligations in whole or in part because the collective interest shall be protected even if 
one state violates its obligation.
71
 
 
To sum up, although the rules on reservation and modification do not expressly speak of 
bilateral and collective obligations, an obligation is of a collective nature if it is an 
expression of the collective interest of the member states, i.e. the object and purpose of 
the agreement and thus the possibility to alter erga omnes obligations is much more 
limited than with regard to bilateral obligations where only two states define the 
relationship between themselves, even in the context of a multilateral treaty. 
 
2.4. The ASR: Enforcing treaty obligations 
The ASR are inter alia concerned with the question under what circumstances a state 
may invoke the responsibility of another state. Two important aspects that have also 
been dealt with by the ICJ in a number of cases, namely legal standing and 
countermeasures, shall be discussed.  
                                                          
70
 YbILC 1966, Vol. II, 255, para. 8 
71
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 61. This is not to be confused with the right to countermeasures which may 
also allow a state to pause certain treaty obligations towards the other member state, as the termination 
and suspension means that the whole treaty obligation is put out of force, see Art. 60(4) VCLT.  
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2.4.1. Legal Standing 
Legal standing can be defined as ‘the right to make a claim’.72 It has been circumscribed 
as the requirement for a State to establish a sufficient link between itself and the legal 
rule that forms the subject matter of the dispute.
73
 In other words it is the question 
which state can be said to have an interest in the observance of a certain rule.
74
 Yet, it 
must be distinguished between a general interest and a legal interest, the latter meaning 
an interest that is legally protected.
75
 Even though there is no uniform understanding of 
legal standing in international law it entails aspects such as access to court, right to be 
party in a proceeding and procedural capacity.
76
  
 
2.4.1.1. The point of departure: Jurisprudence of the PCIJ and ICJ 
Generally, a state has legal standing if it has suffered an injury due to the conduct of 
another state. Yet, already the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ) had to deal with the 
question whether states are permitted to bring a suit although they might not have 
suffered any damage or injury. Based on Art. 386 para. 1
77
 of the Treaty of Peace of 
Versailles, the Court found in the S.S. Wimbledon Case that all four Governments had 
legal standing to bring a case against Germany, although passage had only been refused 
to a British Vessel by the German authorities. The Court found it sufficient that 
“[...] each of the four Applicant Powers has a clear interest in the execution of 
the provisions relating to the Kiel Canal, since they all possess fleets and 
merchant vessels flying their respective flags.”78 
The court thus implicitly clarified that any party might have an interest in the 
enforcement of a treaty, although the three applicants were not as yet and could have 
only potentially been affected in the future. It relied on the wording of Article 386 of the 
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 Blacks Law Dictionary (7
th
 Edition) 1413 
73
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 26.  
74
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 28.  
75
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 28.  
76
 Del Vecchio A ‘Internaitonal Courts and Tribunals, Standing’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2010).  
77
 Article 386 para 1 reads: “In the event of violation of any of the conditions of Articles 380 to 386, or of 
disputes as to the interpretation of these articles, any interested Power can appeal to the jurisdiction 
instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations”. 
78
 Case of the S. S. Wimbledon (France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan v. Germany) (Merits) [1923] PCIJ 
(ser A) No 1 14 20.  
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Versailles Treaty which gave any interested Power “the right to appeal to the 
jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations”. Thus, especially the 
contractual design gave rise to the understanding that all parties had legal standing. 
 
The ICJ discussed legal standing also in connection with the nature of the underlying 
obligation. The distinction between bilateral and erga omnes obligations was introduced 
in the famous case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited decided in 1970.
79
 Not too long before, in their application in 1960 Ethiopia 
and Liberia alleged that the then Union of South Africa violated the Mandate given by 
the League of Nation in 1920 for South West Africa.
80
 The Court after allowing the case 
at the first stage subsequently denied legal standing.
81
 The court ruled that Ethiopia and 
Liberia had no jus standi, because none of their rights had been violated by South 
Africa’s conduct in South-West Africa. Yet, it could have been argued that the 
obligations allegedly violated by South Africa were those of an erga omnes character 
that gave rise to the concern of the international community.
82
  
 
This line of argument was only developed in Barcelona Traction. Although the 
background of both cases is completely different, similarly, in Barcelona Traction the 
question arose with regard to legal standing, namely whether Belgium could bring a 
case against Spain, seeking reparation for certain damages allegedly caused by acts 
committed by organs of the Spanish State contrary to international law.
83
 Spain argued 
that only Canada may bring a claim as the injured company was based in Canada.
84
 
Canada however had no interest in bringing a case, as Canadians had only suffered 
                                                          
79
 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) 
(Merits) [1970] ICJ Reports 3 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].  
80
 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa) (First Phase) (Application of 4 
November 1960) [1961] ICJ Reports 4. 
81
 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ 
Reports 1966 6.  
82
 Ibid paras 49-51: “Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis for rules of law, 
just as, for instance, the preambular parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political 
basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set out. Such interests do not in themselves amount to 
rules of law. All States are interested – have an interest – in such matters. But the existence of an 
‘interest’ does not of itself entail that this interest is specifically juridical in character. [ . . . ] In order to 
generate legal rights and obligations, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form”.  
83
 Barcelona Traction (1970) 6.  
84
 Barcelona Traction (1970) 15 
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minor damages. Belgium, on the other hand, had a major interest as the majority of the 
company’s shareholders were Belgian nationals.85 
 
The Court stressed that for a State to have a right to bring a case before the ICJ the State 
is required to firstly establish that the opponent state breached an international 
obligation and secondly that this obligation was owed to it.
86
 With regard to the 
question whether an obligation is owed to a particular state, the ICJ ruled 
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations 
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-
à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.”87 
 
The Court further specified that those obligations are for example the prohibition of 
aggression and genocide, basic human rights, protection from slavery or racial 
discrimination.
88
 However, as such obligations were not at stake in the case at hand, 
although rights of Belgian shareholders were in fact violated, obligations only arose 
towards Canada, where the company was seated.
89
 Thus, only Canada could have 
brought a claim on the background of diplomatic protection for its company. Belgium 
on the other hand was not considered to have jus standi to bring the claim against Spain.  
 
The ruling in Barcelona Traction had a far reaching effect: with regard to those 
obligations owed to the community as a whole every state may have an interest in 
adherence of the obligation. This would enable any state to enforce obligations based on 
the fact that an obligation with an erga omnes character had been violated.  
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 Barcelona Traction (1970) 15.  
86
 Barcelona Traction (1970) 33, referring to Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Reports 181-182.  
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 Barcelona Traction (1970) 33 [original emphasis].  
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However, the limits of the ruling were also soon to become apparent. In the Case 
Concerning East Timor although the court agreed that Portugal invoked an erga omnes 
obligation, namely the right to self-determination,
90
 the court still declared the 
application impermissible. The Court made it clear that the question of legal standing 
has to be separated from the issue of jurisdiction.
91
 Drawing on the Monetary Gold Rule 
that a Court may not exercise its jurisdiction if the State has not consented to it
92
 the ICJ 
found that since Indonesia would be affected by a ruling in the case but had not given its 
consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ the claim by Portugal against Australia was 
inadmissible. To put it with the words of the Court:  
“Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the 
lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an 
evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party 
to the case. Where there is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question 
is a right erga omnes.”93  
Hence, the importance of the determination of bilateral obligations and obligations with 
an erga omnes character is crucial although limits do apply with regard to the 
enforcement of such rights in light of the jurisdiction of a court.  
 
Yet, it should be noticed that the restriction that a court may not have jurisdiction 
although an erga omnes partes obligation is invoked is an aspect of less relevance with 
regard to the WTO, as by agreeing to the WTO agreements parties generally accept 
jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement System. Thus, WTO members may not be able to 
invoke a similar argumentation as Australia did with regard to Indonesia.
94
 Regarding 
claims that are concerned with the rights and obligations of WTO members the DSB has 
jurisdiction for disputes arising among its member states.  
 
                                                          
90
 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Merits) [1995] ICJ Reports 90 102. 
91
 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) 102.  
92
 Case of the monetary gold from removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and 
United States) (Preliminary Question) [1954] ICJ Reports 19.  
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 Case of the monetary gold from removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and 
United States) 19.  
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2.4.1.2. Enforcement according to the ASR 
The ASR are built on the distinction introduced by the ICJ. Within a bilateral agreement 
a breach of an obligation leads to responsibility of the respective state, Art. 42 (a) ASR. 
The other side may invoke responsibility in front of a competent court or arbitration 
forum having legal standing as the injured party.  
 
The picture gets more complicated with regard to multilateral treaties. According to 
Article 42 (b) ASR  
“A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another 
State if the obligation breached is owed to:  
 (b) a group of States including that State, or the international community as a 
whole, and the breach of the obligation:  
(i) specially affects that State; or  
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the 
other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further 
performance of the obligation”. [emphasis added] 
 
It is important to notice that Article 42 ASR speaks of an “injured” state, i.e. a state that 
is itself adversely affected by the breach. This might either be the case in a multilateral 
treaty with collective obligations when the breach of the obligation affects that state 
particularly, alternative (i) or because of the nature of the obligation the violation injures 
all parties to the treaty, alternative (ii). It has been observed that the latter category 
refers to what Fitzmaurice had in mind on the effect of interdependent obligations.
95
 
Regarding interdependent norms the obligations of the parties are interlinked in a way 
that one state performs because the other parties do as well. Consequently, if one state 
fails to perform this also affects all other parties in their will to perform leaving all other 
parties injured. Article 46 only clarifies that in case of more than one party being 
injured, every party may invoke the responsibility of the state breaching its obligation.  
 
On the other hand, Article 48 ASR also allows the invocation of the responsibility of 
another state without the state being injured. This right is not based on the complaining 
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state being adversely affected but rather on the basis that the obligation was owed 
towards a group of states or the community as a whole. Article 48 ASR reads:  
“Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:  
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and 
is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or  
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 
[emphasis added]  
The first subsection refers to so called erga omnes partes obligations while the latter 
subsection refers to obligations that are owed to the international community as a whole 
independent of a treaty system (erga omnes partes). In both cases, the obligation needs 
to be established for the protection of a collective interest. In this case, any state other 
than the injured may claim the cessation of the internationally wrongful act and 
reparation in the interest of the injured state, Art. 48 para. 2 ASR.  
 
In summary, according to the ASR an injured state may have legal standing. 
Additionally, any state (to a treaty) may invoke responsibility in case a collective 
obligation was breached either because of its interdependent or erga omnes nature.  
 
2.4.1.3. Exemplary treaty rules on legal standing 
As with regard to any other aspect discussed in this section, parties to a treaty are 
generally free to agree on differing rules. Yet, often treaty provision mirror the VCLT or 
ASR understanding. An example of a very clear broad legal standing provision is 
Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, adopted in 1919, which states that  
“[a]ny of the [ILO] Members has the right to file a complaint with the 
International Labour Office if it is not satisfied that any other Member is 
securing the effective observance of any Convention which both have ratified”.96  
Similarly broad provisions can be found in the Genocide Convention (Art. IX), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 33) as well as in a number of other 
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treaties.
97
 The same holds true for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Art. 30. It is particularly important that while no 
party ever successfully relied on legal standing on the basis of a violation of an erga 
omnes (partes) obligation, in the recent Case Questions Relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) of 2012 the court for the first time based 
the right to bring a claim on the violation of the erga omnes partes obligations of the 
Torture Convention, namely Art. 6 and 7.
98
  
 
To sum up, bilateral obligations may only be invoked by the injured party while with 
regard to obligations erga omnes any state – in case of erga omnes obligations – or any 
state member to the treaty – in case of erga omnes partes obligations –  may invoke the 
responsibility of the state being in breach of its obligations.  
 
2.4.2. Countermeasures 
Regarding the right to countermeasures a number of aspects are much debated among 
scholars.
99
 In its broadest sense countermeasures can be circumscribed as all possible 
reactions of states “in order to urge a violation state to end its breach of the law”.100  
The right to countermeasures might be more restrictive than to have legal standing as 
the former refers to the right of a state to directly apply certain measures against the 
defaulting member in its own capacity while the latter only means the possibility to 
invoke responsibility in front of a competent tribunal.
101
 The ASR primarily refer to the 
injured State having the right to take countermeasures against the violating state, Art. 
49. Regarding states other than the injured state, Article 54 ASR merely proclaims that  
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 Other examples are Art. 8 Slavery Convention, Art. 22 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
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Convention on Political Rights of Women, Art. 5 Convention on the Right of Correction, Art. 34 
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, Article 10 Supplementary Slavery Convention, Article 10 
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Article 14 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, Art. 22 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 8 
UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education. 
98
 Question relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Merits) [2012] ICJ 
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“This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, 
paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful 
measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in 
the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached.” 
By merely referring to lawful measures, it leaves open the question what kind of 
measures a state may undertake acting on behalf of the international community or a 
group of states within a treaty system. The admissibility is thus dependent on the 
respective treaty as customary law has not developed any clear results. Yet, there is a 
tendency that erga omnes (partes) obligations may also allow states other than the 
injured state to adopt countermeasures against the defaulting State.
102
 Yet, it is clear that 
the object of the state’s measures is bound to those stated in Art. 48 para. 2 ASR, 
namely the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured state.
103
  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
To conclude, the distinction between bilateral and collective obligations becomes 
relevant especially with regard to modification and termination/suspension of treaties in 
the VCLT and with regard to legal standing and countermeasures in the ASR. Generally 
speaking, bilateral obligations leave more discretion to its member states and may only 
be enforced by the injured state, while collective obligation protect a collective interest 
and can thus less easily be altered but more easily enforced by any member state of the 
treaty system or the community as a whole.  
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Chapter 3:  Determining the Legal Nature of obligations  
3.1. Introduction 
After understanding the distinction between the different categories of obligations as 
laid down in the VCLT and ASR the next step is to clarify how to determine the legal 
nature of obligations in international treaties. No international treaty contains an explicit 
clause stating that its obligations are bilateral or collective. Thus it is required to 
determine the legal nature by reverting to other aspects such as the drafting history, 
preambles, ministerial declarations, wording and systematic context of the provision 
and its object and purpose. 
 
This question how to determine the legal nature of erga omnes partes obligations 
contained in a treaty needs to be separated from determining erga omnes norms outside 
a treaty, i.e. in customary law. It is already difficult to determine the contents of 
customary law and even more difficult to establish that these norms have jus cogens or 
erga omnes character.
104
 However, this work is concerned with determining the legal 
nature within in a treaty, and specifically within the WTO. Thus, it will only be dealt 
with the question how to determine erga omnes partes obligations.  
  
3.2. The approach of the ICJ 
As was already mentioned above in the Belgium v. Senegal proceedings the ICJ found 
the obligations of the Torture Convention, namely Art. 6 and 7, to have erga omnes 
partes nature. How did the Court arrive at that conclusion? The Court reasoned:  
“The States parties to the Convention have a common interest to ensure, in view 
of their shared values, that acts of torture are prevented and that, if they occur, 
their authors do not enjoy impunity. […] All the other States parties have a 
common interest in compliance with these obligations by the State in whose 
territory the alleged offender is present. That common interest implies that the 
obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties 
                                                          
104
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to the Convention. All the States parties “have a legal interest” in the protection 
of the rights involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33). These obligations may be 
defined as “obligations erga omnes partes” in the sense that each State party has 
an interest in compliance with them in any given case.”105 
The Court connected the object and purpose of the treaty as expression of a common 
interest of the parties and the legal nature of its obligation and legal standing.
106
 The 
Court, quick and easy, concluded that the common interest of the parties “in compliance 
with the obligations [...] implies that the obligations are owed by any State to all other 
States”.107  
 
Yet, the number of separate and dissenting opinions – almost all of them commenting 
on this very aspect – indicates the uncertainty of how to determine the legal nature of an 
obligation in international law and the consequences that follow from an erga omnes 
partes norm.  
 
Judge Donoghue intends to support the Court’s finding in his declaration by arguing 
that the duty of a State must correspond “to a right on the part of some or all of the other 
parties; this is inherent in the nature of treaty relations”.108 He goes on to state that “it is 
difficult to see why the duty would be owed to some parties but not to others”.109 After 
giving an example of unenforceability in case the obligations would be understood as 
bilateral he concludes that “the obligations at issue could be entirely hollow unless they 
are obligations erga omnes partes.”110 However, it is hard to see how this would ever 
lead to a distinction between bilateral and collective obligations in multilateral treaties 
as always the danger of unenforceability exists if only the injured state is in a position to 
invoke the responsibility of the party in breach of its obligations. It is submitted that it is 
after all the obligation of the court to reveal the will and intent of the parties and not to 
                                                          
105
 Belgium v. Senegal para. 68 [original emphasis]. 
106
 This fact is however disputed in the dissenting opinion by Judge Xue 3-4, especially para. 16 
107
 Belgium v. Senegal (2012) para. 68.  
108
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109
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become the legislature who adds extra meaning in order for a treaty regime to make 
sense and to be better enforceable.  
  
Judge Trinidade argues that both parties, Belgium and Senegal made statements 
revealing that both parties understanding these obligations as having an erga omnes 
character.
111
 Yet, with all due respect, the question is not what Belgium and Senegal 
think but what the common understanding of the member states is. The nature of Art. 6 
and 7 of the Torture Convention cannot be of erga omnes partes character in the 
bilateral relationship between Senegal and Belgium and of a collective nature in the 
relations of other member states. This would really undermine the idea of collective 
obligations.  
 
Judge Xue goes as far as criticising the Court’s conclusion as “abrupt and 
unpersuasive”.112 The arguments presented by the Court in her view do not demonstrate 
that the parties “intended to create obligations erga omnes”.113 The approach is also 
criticised by Judge Skotnikov who finds that merely quoting the Preamble may not lead 
to the conclusion that the obligations have an erga omnes partes character.
114
  
 
Judge Sur argues in favour of a norm-by-norm approach because “to reason otherwise 
would be to adopt an approach to the question that is more ideological than legal”.115 
Judge Sur presents a number of aspects that should be taken into account namely the 
nature of ordinary meaning of its terms, its context, subsequent practice, the intention of 
the parties and the treaty’s object and purpose.116 However, in his view the Court 
merely from the overall object and purpose of the treaty made a conclusion regarding all 
obligations of the treaty in general and only Art. 6 and 7 of the Torture Convention in 
particular.
117
 He presents arguments that speak against this thesis, especially the fact 
that parties may opt out of the particular mechanism for the Committee against Torture 
                                                          
111
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(Art. 17-24).
118
 The possibility to opt out indicates, in his opinion, that the obligations 
may not have an erga omnes partes character.
119
 
 
The Court’s reasoning as well as the differing opinions by the Judges reveal that not 
even the ICJ and its judges have as of yet developed a coherent and systematic approach 
to the question of determining the legal nature of treaty obligations. 
 
3.3. Existing approaches on the legal nature of WTO obligations 
Only a number of academics have commented on the question of the legal nature of 
WTO obligations after Pauwelyn initiated the discussion in 2003, especially Carmody 
and Gazzini. This justifies looking into their contribution to the question in greater 
detail. Pauwelyn
120
 argues that WTO obligations are bilateral in nature. Carmody
121
 
takes the opposite view, while Gazzini
122
 presents a middle ground position. Have they 
found a coherent approach how to determine the legal nature of WTO obligations? 
Although there appears to be accordance that a norm-by-norm determination is 
necessary, their approaches lack a coherent and systematic underlying basis. 
 
3.3.1. WTO norms as a bundle of bilateral obligations 
Pauwelyn begins his discussion by suggesting that generally speaking obligations in 
international public law rather have a bilateral character and thus it is upon those 
academics to argue and to proof to the contrary that an obligation has a collective 
character.
123
 However, it might be true from a historic point of view that international 
public law was rather a bilateral matter between two states. However, as stated above,
124
 
this radically changed after World War II. Simma convincingly argues for international 
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law to have developed from bilateralism to community interests.
125
 The WTO and its 
agreements which only came into existence in 1994 can thus not so easily be accorded 
to a time where relations were rather bilateral. On the contrary, more recent 
international law regimes have been established to protect collective interests, such as 
human rights or the environment. Seen in light of that development, Pauwelyn’s 
argument as such might not be valid anymore.  
 
Although Pauwelyn is of the opinion that only a norm-by-norm approach can really 
determine the legal nature of an obligation, he approaches the question by arguing in 
general with the WTO agreements by and large, their object and purpose and the 
underlying reality of trade relations. Pauwelyn is of the opinion that the WTO 
agreements – although being a multilateral contract with more than 150 member states – 
consist mainly of a bundle of bilateral obligations.
126
 He argues that the object and 
purpose of the WTO agreements is the regulation of trade. Trade in and of itself i.e. 
selling and buying goods or services takes place between two member states only. Even 
if more than one state contributes to the production process of the product the 
agreements provide to determine the origin of a certain product, making trade again a 
bilateral matter.
127
  
 
It might be true that the actual movement of goods between State A and B is of a 
bilateral nature. However, this does not lead to irrevocably understanding the 
obligations concerning participation in the global marketplace as bilateral. In most cases 
a treaty also regulates the bilateral relation between two parties. Yet, over and above it 
might protect a collective interest which is independent of the bilateral reality of the 
treaty. For example a treaty on the protection of the environment may determine rights 
and obligations of neighbouring states, but it additionally protects the collective interest, 
namely to protect the environment. Pauwelyn compares the Agreement on Diplomatic 
Relations and the WTO Agreement.
128
 Yet, this is not a strong support for Pauwlyn’s 
                                                          
125
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argument. Even with regard to the Convention on Diplomatic Relations did the ICJ in 
the Teheran Hostages Case state that it 
“[...]consider[s] it to be its duty to draw the attention of the entire international 
community, of which Iran itself has been a member since time immemorial, to 
the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind now before the 
Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine the edifice of law carefully 
constructed by mankind over a period of centuries, the maintenance of which is 
vital for the security and well-being of the complex international community of 
the present day, to which it is more essential than ever that rules developed to 
ensure the ordered progress of relations between its members should be 
constantly and scrupulously be respected.”129  
Third states such as France and Germany also took measures against Iran, albeit these 
were lawful measures not requiring these countries of being entitled to 
countermeasures.
130
 This indicates that even agreements that were found to be clear 
examples of treaties containing bilateral obligations are in an ever more globalised 
world more and more found to be collective in nature concerning all member states.
131
  
 
The WTO agreements are to a much greater extent than the Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations the outcome of negotiations that reflect the balance of interest of all member 
states and the collective interest to create a common and fair international 
marketplace.
132
 Thus, the rights and obligations are to a far greater degree interlinked 
and dependent on each other as this is the case with regard to e.g. diplomatic relations. 
This is supported by some WTO agreements and norms being concerned with the 
“world market” (e.g. Preamble third recital Agriculture Agreement (AA), Art. 6.3(d) 
SCM) and thus not only with the bilateral relation of two member states, but rather with 
the organization and protection of an undistorted global market on which all member 
states can fairly trade with each other.
133
 This common market place also explains why 
the violation of an obligation towards one member state may also affect one or more 
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other states, as trade flows are interlinked and dependent on each other. A member state 
due to the subsidy policy of another member state in one sector may decide to invest 
into a completely different sector thereby affecting yet other states. Thus, almost any 
violation at least potentially may affect a great number if not all member states. 
 
Pauwelyn’s next argument is based on the fact that many trade concessions are 
negotiated on a bilateral level and subsequently extended to other member states via the 
Most-favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. This, in Pauwelyn’s view also indicates that 
the obligations are of a rather bilateral nature.
134
 Although the observation might be true 
with regard to the individual list of concessions, it does not hold true with regard to 
WTO agreements, such as the GATS, AA, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
that were agreed by way of multilateral negotiations and are reflecting a balance of 
interest of the member states found in these negotiations.  
 
The next argument leads into the same direction, namely that the preferential treatments 
for developing countries are based on bilateral concessions.
135
 Yet, the basis and 
framework for special and differential treatment is to be found in the WTO agreements. 
Waivers have to be granted by all member states, thus on the multilateral level. The 
differential treatment of member states does not lead to an understanding that the 
obligations are bilateral but rather pays tribute to the common understanding that 
different member states require different treatment. If the US by way of the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) then allows for zero tariff imports from 
developing countries this is an expression of the common will of the parties to allow the 
US to better integrate developing countries into the world economy, a goal stipulated 
even in the Preamble of WTO agreements. This is further supported by rulings of the 
DSB that even though developing countries might be treated differently, among this 
group of least developed and developing countries states falling into this category shall 
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be treated equally.
136
 This understanding would not be inevitable if obligations were 
really as bilateral as Pauwelyn argues they are.  
  
Pauwelyn especially distinguishes WTO obligations from obligations arising under 
human rights treaties.
137
 Regarding treaties protecting human rights, generally no 
member state is injured in case of breach of an obligation, as usually a member state 
violates obligations towards the citizens living in its own territory. Due to the fact that 
no state would ever be injured but always the collective interest to protect certain human 
rights for all individuals, it is necessary that all states are enabled to invoke 
responsibility for obligations arising under such treaties.
138
 Yet, human rights treaties 
are in this regard very special and a particularity within the whole system of 
international public law, as “’[u]nlike international treaties of the classical kind’ [..] they 
go beyond reciprocal obligations”.139 A number of other treaties, such as treaties on the 
law of the sea, protection of the environment and in the area of humanitarian law, 
simultaneously protect individual as well as common or collective interests.
140
 With 
regard to the latter example they protect the collective interest of the member states to 
make the inhuman nature of war a little bit more human but also the individual interest 
of the member states to have their soldiers and civilians treated according to the 
minimum standard set forth in the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols.  
 
Pauwelyn argues that quite to the contrary in case of a WTO obligation, generally 
speaking, one or more states will have suffered an injury but never all or no member 
state; this indicates that the obligations are bilateral and not collective.
141
 However, this 
would mean that whenever a treaty protects individual interest responsibility could 
never be invoked by member states other than the one that had actually suffered an 
injury. Yet, already in the early Wimbledon case
142
 the PCIJ clarified that next to 
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England, which ships had been refused passage, other states had an interest in enforcing 
the obligations arising under the Versailles treaty. However, arguing with Pauwelyn, it 
would not have been necessary as England could have enforced the obligation alone.  
 
The VCLT as well as the ASR acknowledge that treaties may protect individual as well 
as community interests and thus the fact that a treaty protects individual interest does 
not lead to the conclusion that it does not at the same time protect collective interests. 
The same is true with regard to the prohibition of aggressive war – an obligation 
generally accepted as erga omnes – that protects the individual interest of each and 
every state not to become the victim of an act of aggression. Yet, at the same time it 
protects the collective interest of the community as a whole to prohibit aggression 
against other states and peoples.  
 
Finally, Pauwelyn refers to the fact that enforcement in the WTO actually takes place on 
a bilateral level.
143
 He argues that Art. XXIII GATT 94 requires that a member state’s 
interest is being nullified or impaired.
144
 However, this totally disregards the second 
half of Art. XXIII GATT 94 which is in fact formulated much broader in that a member 
state may also refer to the DSB if the “attainment of any objective of the Agreement is 
being impeded”.145  
 
To sum up, Pauwelyn’s arguments lack a consistent approach and do not lead to the 
conclusion that all norms of the WTO are indeed bilateral. Even Pauwelyn admits that 
with the coming into existence of the objective order for world trade some of these 
‘regulatory-type’ obligations might be collective.146 
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3.3.2. WTO obligations as obligations erga omnes partes 
Quite contrary to Pauwelyn, it is argued that WTO obligations are obligations erga 
omnes partes.
147
 Carmody states that the WTO agreements protect the “collective 
expectations about the trade-related behaviour of governments”.148 This makes the rules 
“unquantifiable and indivisible and therefore fundamentally unitary in nature”.149  
 
Carmody argues that the very MFN is an obligation towards all member states.
150
 He 
does not only understand the MFN as a legal obligation within the different agreements 
but as the underlying principle of the WTO. It is true that the MFN is one of the 
cornerstones of the WTO agreements. However, this does not proof that via the MFN 
all its obligations are to be understood as collective. Rather, it seems to support that due 
to its importance the MFN itself is a collective obligation.  
 
Furthermore, Carmody points out that the DSU is not concerned with compensation but 
rather the wrongdoer has to bring its measures into conformity with WTO law.
151
 This 
indicates that the violation is not resolved exclusively within the bilateral relation but 
the respective member is obliged to observe its obligations towards all member states by 
again behaving in conformity with the WTO agreements. Yet, the consequences of a 
DSB judgment are disputed. Some argue in favour of a general obligation to bring its 
laws into conformity.
152
 Hitherto, the reality of the DSB draws another picture. Cases 
such as the US – Upland Cotton153 brought to an end by an agreement between USA 
and Brazil without the US ever changing its subsidy policy but rather by it paying a 
certain amount to the Brazilian government – a result in complete contradiction to the 
WTO Agreements – speaks against Carmody’s argument. In this regard, the DSB rather 
functions like a bilateral system, one tends to think, like in a civil procedure, “where 
there is no claimant there is no case”.  
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Carmody’s main argument in understanding WTO obligations as collective is his 
integrated understanding of the WTO agreements as a treaty that predominantly serves 
“as a law of expectations, but also in selected instances as a law of realities and 
ultimately as a law of interdependence.”154  
 
With regard to the first aspect, the ‘law of expectations’ Carmody refers to the trade-
related behaviour of member states. Although the concessions might be negotiated 
bilaterally they are applied in a collective way. Thus, the expectations of the trade-
related behaviour are established among all member states. This is further supported by 
the fact that the interpretation of WTO treaties by the DSB takes place on the basis not 
only of the expectations of the two parties to the dispute but all parties.
155
  
 
The ‘law of realities’ refers to the possibilities of member states to react to certain 
changes, namely by way of Anti-Dumping duties, Safeguard measures and 
Countervailing duties.
156
 These measures are rather bilateral in that they are able to 
adjust a certain measure to the requirements between two parties.
157
 Still the possibility 
to derogate from certain obligations is part of the WTO package and “work to reinforce 
the collectivity of the greater whole”.158 With the last aspect as a law of interdependence 
Carmody incorporates producers and consumers into the picture. He argues that thereby 
an “indissoluble web of economic relations” is created. He connects his thoughts with 
ideas about justice, considering the WTO agreements to be about distributive justice and 
not merely corrective justice.
159
 His overall categorization is rather unclear as while 
earlier in his paper he defines WTO obligations as obligations erga omnes partes at the 
end it appears as if he finds those obligations to fall into the category of interdependent 
obligations. He compares the WTO agreements with a disarmament treaty just that the 
latter is military disarmament while the former is mercantile disarmament. 
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Although there is some truth in that the WTO agreements aims at liberalizing trade and 
in reducing barriers to trade, may they be tariffs or non-tariff barriers and in this regard 
indeed comparable to disarmament, it can be agreed with Pauwelyn that the WTO does 
not contain interdependent obligations.
160
 The obligations are not interlinked in a way 
that one member state only wants to perform when all other member states also perform 
their obligations. The interest of the member state does not stand and fall with only one 
member state not observing its obligations.  
 
Furthermore, such generalized categorization does not lead towards understanding the 
individual character of a particular WTO obligation or clarifies how the legal nature of 
the different WTO obligations can be categorized. There is no link between the 
understanding of the WTO as a law of expectations, realities and interdependence and 
the design of the very different individual WTO norms. The MFN alone cannot serve to 
proof that because all member states are generally to be treated equally that every single 
obligation is - as different as not to provide subsidies or not to apply tariffs higher as 
provided in the schedule - a collective obligation. The MFN may not in and of itself 
serve as the basis for the argument that an obligation is collective, if the member state 
would merely violate any of the above mentioned obligations. Rather, the very 
obligation itself has to be of a collective nature in order for all member states to be able 
to enforce the obligation. The varied and colourful bunch of WTO obligations cannot be 
determined by making broad statements about the overall understanding of the WTO 
agreements or by trying to interlink all obligations via the MFN.  
 
Concerning Carmody’s argument about the interpretation of WTO norms, it is coherent 
that the WTO DSB does not interpret a norm only by referring to the expectations of the 
two member states of the conflict but all member states due to the fact there is only one 
rule to be interpreted. Accordingly and in line with international public law one 
interpretation will be given by the body responsible for the interpretation of the treaty 
text. Yet, does this lead to the norm being collective in nature? No. Interpretation rather 
attempts to finding the ‘true meaning’ of the norm.161  
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Furthermore, his argument that rules on dumping and subsidies are generally bilateral is 
not convincing as his argument is not based on the obligation itself but rather the 
possibility of a state to react towards a breach by another state. It can be asked: Because 
states may bilaterally charge countervailing duties is also the obligation not to provide 
subsidies bilateral? This is already not convincing as the bilateral enforcement track is 
additional to the multilateral enforcement track.  
 
3.3.3. WTO as a ‘potpourri’ of obligations 
Gazzini’s approach is more differentiated. As a starting point, he agrees with Pauwelyn 
that WTO obligations are “always legally divisible”.162 Because it is possible to 
determine the origin of a product and because a violation may affect the right of one but 
not necessarily all member states the WTO agreements consist of a bundle of bilateral 
relationships.
163
 This in Gazzini’s opinion is true for the MFN obligation as well as 
market access and national treatment but especially for anti-dumping measures or 
countervailing duties that are only applied towards the products of one member state.
164
  
 
However, it needs to be responded: does the fact that the violation of an obligation 
specifically affects one or several member states really and irrevocably lead to the 
obligation being purely bilateral? In case of an agreement concerned with protection of 
the environment, only one or two states may directly be affected when waste is spilled 
on the one side of the ocean and arrives at the coast of a state on the other side of the 
ocean. But this does not mean that the obligation to protect the environment is only 
bilaterally enforceable. Rather, because the agreement protects the collective interest to 
protect the environment all member states may be able to enforce said obligation. Thus, 
there might be a collective obligation although one state is affected and not all states.  
 
Gazzini observes that with regard to at least some obligations “contracting parties have 
decided to extend to certain WTO obligations the legal regime of erga omnes 
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 Gazzini The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations (2006) 727; Gazzini C ‘A Theory of WTO Law’ 
(2008) 11 JIEL 1-31.  
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 Gazzini The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations (2006) 727.  
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obligations”.165 For example Art. XXIII (1) GATS allows any party to bring a complaint 
in case of a violation of the services agreement. Also, Art. 3 SCM is seen as an 
obligation with an erga omnes character. Gazzini argues that obligations are bilateral 
but can be collectively enforced. He then observes whether his finding is in line with 
WTO’s rules on legal standing and countermeasures. Especially with regard to the latter 
aspect Gazzini observes that countermeasures can be awarded even if the member state 
itself had not suffered an injury. As in the case of prohibited subsidies in US-FSC or 
Brazil-Aircraft the amount of subsidies was chosen on the background of effectively 
ensuring compliance and not on the adverse effect alone.
166
  
 
Although Gazzini’s results are not unconvincing, Gazzini does not provide us with 
criteria how to determine the legal nature of an obligation. The only criterion presented 
by Gazzini is the divisibility of the norm. Yet, other norms are divisible and still 
considered to have erga omnes character. Additionally, what does it mean that the legal 
regime of erga omnes is extended to certain norms of the WTO. Under what conditions 
could other norms than Art. XXIII and Art. 3 SCM be found to have erga omnes 
consequences? In comparison to Art. 5 and 6 SCM Art. 3 SCM does not require the 
claimant to have suffered an injury because it is assumed that the subsidy will have 
caused adverse effect. Yet, other norms of the WTO agreements also do not require all 
states to have suffered adverse effect. Does this lead to the assumption that all these 
obligations have an erga omnes partes nature? Again, approach and criteria are lacking.  
 
3.4. Three step approach  
The analysis of the existing approaches by the ICJ as well as academics commenting on 
the WTO do not provide a general answer for the determination of the legal nature of 
obligations in international law in general. With regard to the WTO it even appeared as 
if arguments speak for one view while others speak for the other. Sometimes even the 
same aspect, e.g. the MFN is used in favour of both views.  
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There seems to be agreement that the legal nature of obligations can only be determined 
on a norm-by-norm basis. Notwithstanding, rather broad assessments are made about 
the WTO agreements as such. At the same time, rather randomly certain norms are 
picked out in order to proof that obligations in general are rather bilateral or collective, 
because one norm seems to be rather bilateral or collective. Also, the role of the VCLT 
and ASR seems to be quite unclear. Is the determination of the legal nature crucial for 
the question which consequences are in conformity with the VCLT and the ASR or is it 
not the other way around? Are the consequences attached to a breach in the WTO 
agreements not rather indicative for the determination of WTO obligations? Would e.g. 
the fact that the legal standing in the WTO rather fits into the picture of collective 
obligation not lead to the assumption that at least some obligations might have this 
characterization and that a lacunae must be filled with applying rules belonging to 
collective obligations? Even Gazzini’s more distinct approach mixes different levels of 
argumentation for example the material rule of Art. 3 SCM with the rather procedural 
rule of Art. XXIII GATS. 
 
These shortcomings require one to rethink the approach to the question of the 
determination of the legal nature of obligations in international law in general and of the 
WTO in particular. With regard to a treaty the will of the parties becomes apparent in a 
number of aspects, not just the stipulation of the individual obligation but rather the way 
the parties designed the entire treaty.  
 
A three-step approach is suggested. Firstly, collective norms are collective because they 
protect collective interest.
167
 This overall will of the parties needs to be understood in 
order to consider the individual obligations laid out in a treaty. In a first step it is thus 
important to consider whether and what collective interests the WTO agreements 
protect. It will be helpful to take into consideration preambles, ministerial declaration or 
general statements by Panels and the Appellate Body. Only if it can be found that 
collective interests are in fact protected by the WTO agreements is it at all possible that 
a particular obligation serves a collective interest.  
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Secondly, before examining an individual obligation it is important to understand the 
procedural design of a certain treaty. The VCLT and the ASR show which 
consequences are aligned with bilateral and which with collective obligations. In its 
separate opinion Judge Skotnikov criticised that in the judgment only from the object 
and purpose of the Preamble it is drawn on the legal nature of all obligations in the 
treaty.
168
 He examines the legal standing of the European Convention in comparison to 
the provision in the Torture Convention, the former being much broader than the 
latter.
169
 It is submitted that this argument convincingly reveals the importance of taking 
into account the design of a treaty in order to understand the parties will to give power 
to their common interest, i.e. with regard to legal standing provisions or the right to 
modification etc. In international law nothing can be conferred on states, they are the 
origin of the laws. Thus, any interpretation is to be based on the attempt to clarify the 
will of the parties.  
 
This means, if the WTO agreements entail rules on some or all of these aspects this 
might be indicative on how its obligations are to be understood. If the procedural design 
of the DSB mirrors that of treaties with bilateral obligations it is much more realistic 
that the WTO agreements obligations are also of a bilateral nature. Yet, if the result is 
vice versa this may speak in favour of the argument that at least some obligations do 
have erga omnes character. To say it differently, it is a lot less convincing to argue that 
obligations are collective if they are only bilaterally enforceable. And it does not quite 
fit to argue that the parties in deviation from general international public law – without 
any express clarifications in this regard – intended to create bilateral obligations that are 
however collectively enforceable.  
 
Step one and two may not clarify how individual obligations are to be categorized; yet, 
they lay the ground for the interpretation on the third step. At the last level, individual 
obligations need to be looked at in detail. Some might be quite clearly collective due to 
their wording and the protection of collective interests. Others, due to certain material 
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 Separate Opinion Judge Skotnikov 2, para. 13:”One would have expected the Court to have recourse to 
the interpretation of the Convention in order to support its conclusion. Instead, it confines itself to quoting 
from its Preamble and classifying this instrument as being similar to the Genocide Convention. This is 
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169
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prerequisites might not allow an interpretation as collective. Other norms might be more 
ambiguous. Especially in the latter case a careful analysis is necessary of what 
collective interest the individual norm protects. The clearer it mirrors one of the 
collective interests found at the first level will it be justified to characterize the norm as 
collective. Hence, the well-known interpretation methods such as wording, drafting 
history and the object and purpose laid down in the VCLT have to be taken into account 
in order to evaluate WTO obligations in conformity with the understanding of 
international law as a system of legal norms.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Due to the different arguments brought forward so far, stretching from arguing that all 
or most obligations are bilateral to the appraisal that all or most are collective it could be 
seen that a coherent approach on how to determine the legal nature of an obligation is 
missing. Thus, a three-step approach has been developed which will firstly analyze the 
collective interest protected by the WTO agreements, secondly analyse how the WTO 
approaches aspects that in general international law reflect the understanding of bilateral 
and collective obligations and will thirdly determine the legal nature of certain core 
WTO obligations with regard to whether they protect a collective interest and by way of 
interpretation are to be understood as bilateral or collective.  
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4. Chapter: Determination of the legal nature of WTO obligations 
4.1. Introduction 
In order to determine the legal nature of WTO obligations the three step approach 
presented above will be applied.
170
 Firstly, it will be examined whether the WTO 
agreements protect collective interests. Secondly, it will be scrutinized how the WTO 
resolves aspects that in general international law reflect bilateral and collective interests, 
namely altering and enforcing treaty obligations. Thirdly, individual obligations of the 
WTO shall be looked at in greater detail.  
 
4.2. Step one: Do the WTO agreements protect collective interests?  
In a first step it needs to be determined whether the WTO agreements protect collective 
interests. The purpose of the Preamble has been acknowledged by the Appellate Body 
when it stated that the “language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO 
Agreement, we believe it muss add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of 
the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement”.171 Yet, the WTO with its many 
agreements regulating almost all aspects of international trade is much more complex in 
its goals than say the Genocide or the Torture Convention, aiming at eliminating these 
particular kinds of atrocities. The WTO’s object and purpose might not be singular but 
manifold.  
    
4.2.1. The GATT 47 
The GATT of 1947 (GATT 47) was drafted against the background of half a century of 
economic crisis and World War II. Leaders of key states believed that further economic 
integration and interdependence would contribute to cooperative behaviour among 
states and economic growth worldwide.
172
 In comparison to e.g. the Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations which was codified on the basis of customary international law, 
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Pakistan, Thailand) (1998) WT/DS58/AB/R para 153 [hereinafter US – Shrimp]. 
172
Bagwell K & Staiger AW The Economics of the World Trading System (2002) 44-45. 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
i.e. a long standing international practice and opinio juris, the GATT 47 is to much 
greater extent the result of the will of the parties to design an international trade order 
with certain characteristics. The GATT 47, incorporated by the GATT 94,
173
  is first and 
foremost concerned with trade. The Preamble clearly states that it aims at the 
“substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce”.174 Thus, the admissibility of a 
measure must always be considered against the background of the restrictive effect this 
measure might produce for the goal of further liberalising trade and the objects and 
purpose stated above.
175
  
 
Yet, already with coming into existence of the GATT 94 the parties agreed not only to 
adhere to certain rules when trading with each other but rather stipulated the goal  
“to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of 
the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of 
goods.”176  
It can be inferred from this part of the preamble that the member states did not only 
want to regulate their trade relations but that they created the GATT 94 with a number 
of ideas in mind, namely raising the standard of living, full employment, growing 
volume of real income and the full use of resources of the world. The general objective 
was the expanding of trade in goods and services and the reduction of barriers to 
trade.
177
 The objects were to be gained by the further liberalization of trade and are thus 
also important when interpreting WTO norms.  
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  Thus, in the following it will be referred to as GATT 94.  
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of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Meat (Republic of Korea v. US) (2000) WT/DS161/AB/R para. 163; see 
also China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
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4.2.2. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO  
The protection of collective interests is even more apparent with regard to the WTO 
agreements that institutionalized international trade relations and further integrated 
almost all aspects of international trade in the WTO framework. The establishment of 
the WTO in 1994 reflects the idea that the WTO is not a mere collection of rules on 
international trade, but rather in the Marrakesh Declaration  
“Ministers affirm that the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) ushers in a new era of global economic cooperation, reflecting the 
widespread desire to operate in a fairer and more open multilateral trading 
system for the benefit and welfare of their peoples.”178  
The passage reflects the comprehensive approach when establishing the World Trade 
Organisation. The mention of terms such as “fairer” and “more open multilateral trading 
system” for the “benefit and welfare of their peoples” proofs the collective interest of 
the parties. Especially the role of developing countries and their better integration is 
stressed when the declaration formulates, that “[t]his has marked a historic step towards 
a more balanced and integrated global trade partnership.”179  
 
The WTO Agreement aimed at ending the “fragmentation that had characterized the 
previous system” and to “develop, more viable and durable multilateral trading system 
encompassing the GATT, the result of past trading liberalization efforts and all of the 
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations”.180 Hence, the WTO 
Agreement largely confirms the aims of the GATT 94 but expressly includes other 
objects such as the  
“objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development”181  
And especially  
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 Uruguay Round Agreement Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 para. 2.  
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“to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among 
them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development”182 
It has expressly been confirmed that the WTO Preamble recognizes the “importance of 
coordinating policies on trade and environment”,183 the objective of sustainable 
development
184
 and the common goal of better integrating developing countries.
185
 
These examples lead to the conclusion that the WTO indeed protects collective 
interests.  
 
Opponents of the thesis that the WTO contains collective obligations argue with the 
third recital of the preamble which refers to “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements.”186 But, the reference to “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements” does not necessarily speak in favour of understanding the WTO 
obligations as bilateral. It is rather an expression of the fact that the GATT 94 
negotiation and the agreement are based on a “give and take” of the member states. The 
Appellate Body stated in EC – Tariff Preferences that “this objective [to raise the 
standards of living] was to be achieved in countries at all stages of economic 
development through the universally-applied commitments embodied in the GATT 
provisions.”187 Similarly, the Panel in EC – Chicken Cuts stressed that any 
interpretation should not “disrupt the balance of concessions negotiated by the 
parties”.188 These statements emphasize that the arrangements are negotiated taking into 
consideration what the other member states gained and had to give up and thus reflect 
the balance of interest found thereby interlinking all rights and obligations with each 
other. This understanding is further supported by the single undertaking approach, 
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meaning that “virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible 
package.”189  
 
The WTO agreements were concluded in the collective interest to create a common, 
global marketplace on which the participants follow the same rules and regulations. 
Generally the WTO is understood to have three purposes, namely the liberalisation of 
trade, to cover all trade aspects and to provide clear rules that make trade more 
predictable and lastly to provide a forum for further trade negotiations among the 
member states.
190
 It has been confirmed on several occasions that one of the main 
objectives is the security and predictability of the international trading system.
191
 The 
whole trading system is largely based on the principle of non-discrimination. Thus, the 
rules are not a mere codification of more or less random, yet constant practice of states 
but were created with a purpose and a collective interest in mind.  
 
This understanding is supported by the fact that the system is also created in order for 
individuals and companies to be able to trade on this international market.
192
 In the US 
– Section 301-310 the Panel stressed the importance of the “creation of market 
conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global market 
places”.193 
 
These considerations go hand in hand with yet another discussion namely the one 
discussion dubbed ‘Constitutionalization of Trade Law’.194 Reference to the WTO 
agreement as a constitution should not be equalized with domestic understanding of a 
constitution that regulates the basic relationship between the government and its 
peoples. Rather, it is used as an analogy: regarding aspects such as the institutional and 
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[hereinafter US – Sections 301-310]. 
194
 See e.g. Langille Neither Constitution Nor Contract (2011); Dunoff The WTO’s Constitution (2006) 
656-661; Cass Constitutionalization of Internaitonal Trade Law (2001) 39-75; DeWet E ‘The 
International Constitutional Order’ (2009) 55 ICQL 51 53.  
 
 
 
 
55 
 
structural outline, judicial review and the binding commitments outlined by the WTO 
agreements. Most important is the aspect of hierarchy. Understanding the WTO 
agreements as constitutional means that they are categorised as a higher form of law 
superseding other agreements in the area of trade.
195
 They aim to secure the freedom of 
trade and are thus owed to the collective.
196
 This approach is mainly based on the fact 
that any trade agreement between a limited number of states has to be in conformity 
with the WTO rules. This proofs that the WTO is the generally higher rule, ignoring 
especially the rule of lex posterior and lex specialis that generally governs the 
relationship of agreements in international law. Similarly to Art. 103 UNC, with regard 
to trade, the WTO is of a higher hierarchical order comparable to a constitution.  
 
4.2.3. Other Agreements 
A number of agreements are preceded by a preamble that may express the common 
interest of the parties with regard to that particular agreement. E.g. the AA, the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Rules of 
Origin confirm the collective interest of the member states either with regard to the 
goals established by the GATT 94 or the WTO Agreement or additionally formulate 
certain aspects important with regard to that very agreement. 
 
Even when the agreement does not contain a preamble Panels and the Appellate Body 
made statements on the object and purpose of the agreement. For example with regard 
to the SCM Agreement it was stressed that the object and purpose of the Agreement was 
“to increase and improve GATT disciplines relating to the use of both subsidies and 
countervailing measures”197 and “to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which 
distort international trade”.198 This expresses the common interest of the parties of not 
being adversely affected by subsidies and to eliminate practices that distort the market 
in general.
199
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Especially with regard to the security and predictability did Panels and the Appellate 
Body confirm that the Dispute Settlement System was one of the most important 
instruments to protect and further this very objective of the WTO agreements.
200
 Hence, 
the DSU has to be interpreted in light of this very object and purpose and in a manner 
that enhances this goal effectively. This is also one of the reasons why the DSU allows 
“as such” and not only “as applied” complaints as GATT and WTO “are intended to 
protect not only existing trade but also the security and predictability needed to conduct 
future trade”.201 The Appellate Body clarified that with a view to private economic 
activities the WTO in general and the DSB have certain objectives  
“[t]he most relevant in our view are those which relate to the creation of market 
conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global 
markets and to the provision of a secure and predictable multilateral trading 
system.”202  
To sum up, already the GATT 94 but especially the WTO Agreement as well as more 
particular agreements in their respective preamble lead to the conclusion that these 
agreements not merely regulate trade between two members bilaterally but that they 
protect the collective interest of establishing a common marketplace. This common 
marketplace serves collective interests such as inter alia the growth of the economy of 
member states, reduction of poverty, protection of health or the integration of 
developing countries. This is confirmed by ministerial statements as well as 
jurisprudence.  
 
4.3. Step 2: Procedural design 
After finding that the WTO protects collective interest, the procedural design shall be 
looked at in greater detail. This step does not allow the determination of the individual 
nature of WTO obligations but it enables reconstructing the overall understanding of the 
WTO agreements and to a greater extend the underlying will of the parties. It will lead 
to a better overall understanding of the WTO regarding aspects that in general 
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international public law are expressions of bilateral or collective obligations and can 
guide the individual determination of the legal nature of WTO obligations.  
 
4.3.1. Alteration 
First, the question whether treaty obligations can be altered by a member State by way 
of reservations or inter se modifications is discussed. Secondly, the consequence of 
bilateral and collective obligations with regard to Suspension and termination in the 
WTO agreements shall be examined.   
 
4.3.1.1. Reservations 
The WTO Agreement provides in Art. XVI:5 that no reservations may be made in 
respect of any provision of the WTO Agreement. Reservations in respect of any of the 
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent 
provided for in those Agreements. Reservations in respect of a provision of a 
Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement. 
 
A number of agreements, namely Art. 18.2 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. 32.2 SCM, Art. 15 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Art. 72 Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Properties, contain the following provision: “Reservations may not be 
entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without the consent of the 
other Members”. This demonstrates that it is upon all member states to agree to any 
reservation made by a member State. It is thus not within the bilateral relationship of 
two member states to accept a reservation but by the consent of all other members 
collectively. If the WTO obligations were purely bilateral it would be the business of 
the individual pairs of states to either accept or refuse a reservation. However, the rule 
on reservation rather reflects the approach of multilateral treaties containing collective 
obligations.  
 
Yet, GATT 94 and GATS as well as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Agreement on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Agriculture, Dispute Settlement 
Understanding and Trade Policy Review mechanism are silent as to the question which 
reservation is admissible. This requires applying the VCLT proofing against the 
requirement to determine the legal nature of the WTO obligations.
203
  
 
4.3.1.2. Modification 
Inter se modifications are modifications by only a limited number of member states to a 
multilateral treaty by way of a subsequent agreement altering the obligations among 
them.
204
 From the general section above it could be seen that inter se modification 
according to Art. 41 VCLT is legitimate if this possibility is provided in the treaty or the 
modification is not prohibited and does not affect third party rights and is not in 
contradiction with the object and purpose of the treaty.  
 
With regard to the WTO two different kinds of modifications need to be distinguished: 
agreements that further liberalise trade and those that restrict trade among a limited 
number of member states. They can be circumscribed as ‘WTO plus’ and ‘WTO minus’ 
agreements.
205
 The WTO agreements only contain rules regarding further liberalization 
but it is however silent with respect to restricting trade among a limited number of 
member states.
206
  
 
Regarding ‘WTO plus’ agreements, Art. XXIV GATT 94 and Art. V GATS enable the 
member states to modify certain treaty obligations in order to gain deeper integration 
among a limited number of member states departing from the MFN. Thus, the 
possibility of a Free Trade Agreement is provided for by the treaty in the sense of Art. 
41 (1) (a) VCLT; Art. 41 (1) (b) VCLT is not applicable.
207
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Yet, regarding ‘WTO minus’ agreements the WTO does not provide rules making it 
necessary to fall back on general international public law. If the WTO obligations were 
purely bilateral, inter se modification could as a matter of fact not affect third party 
rights. Yet, apart from the fact that ‘WTO minus’ provisions might be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the WTO with regard to the goal to further liberalizing 
trade,
208
 ‘WTO minus’ agreements may also affect third party rights. Art. 41(1) (b) 
VCLT is not only concerned with the formal status of rights and obligations but rather 
refers to “the enjoyment by other parties of their rights under the treaty or the 
performance of their obligations”. Thus, it also matters whether the inter se 
modification directly or indirectly affects third party rights.
209
  Parties concluding a 
treaty may also be protected in their expectations what to gain under the treaty not with 
regard to particular trade flows but regarding trade related behaviour of other member 
states.  
 
Concerning so called ‘GATS-minus’ agreements, Adlung and Morrison argue that due 
to the different modes of supply in trade in services the effects are much more 
interlinked and thus “GATS obligations are much less bilateral in nature than trade 
obligations for goods”.210 Hence, GATS minus agreements potentially affect the 
enjoyment of third party rights.
211
 While agreeing with their findings made under 
GATS, the same holds also true with regard to trade in goods. The change in trade flows 
due to WTO minus agreements may affect the enjoyment of the rights of third parties, 
positively – if other parties may gain a bigger trade share – but also negatively – if e.g. 
suppliers may have worse access to certain products at their production plant in the 
respective country.  
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Thus, parties are not free to modify their bilateral trade relations under the WTO 
agreements neither by bilaterally agreeing to more or less integration apart from what is 
allowed by the WTO agreements themselves in Art. XXIV GATT 94 and Art. V GATS. 
The understanding that parties may not by way of bilateral or multilateral agreements to 
which not all member states are party alter the obligations set forth in the multilateral 
WTO agreements has also been confirmed by case law. In EC-Poultry the Appellate 
Body stressed that Schedule LXXX was annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol and 
therefore an integral part of the ‘multilateral obligations under the WTO Agreement’.212 
The Oilseeds Agreement on the other hand, between Brazil and the European 
Communities, was a bilateral agreement and not part of the multilateral obligations 
accepted by the parties.
213
 Thus it could not alter Schedule LXXX.  
 
This is a sign that WTO obligations are not understood as consisting only of bilateral 
obligations if one takes into consideration how treaties usually regulate the right to 
modification in treaties with bilateral obligations.
214
 However, this alone would not 
proof the collective character of WTO obligations, at least not with regard to the 
question which individual WTO obligation might be understood as bilateral and which 
one as collective. Yet, it is an indication for the fact that GATS obligations but also 
GATT 94 obligations are not purely bilateral.  
  
4.3.1.3. Suspension/termination of treaties 
Suspension or termination is the permanent interruption of relations in case of breach of 
a member state. This mechanism has to be distinguished from the right to 
countermeasure, which is also a possible reaction to a breach of another member state. 
Yet, the difference lies in its purpose: while the suspension or termination aims at 
ending temporarily or permanently the agreement, countermeasures aim at enforcing 
treaty obligations.  
 
                                                          
212
 European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC v. Brazil) 
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The WTO does not give parties the right to suspend or terminate treaty obligations in 
case of violation by another member states. The silence would require considering the 
VCLT in case the question would ever arise between member states. As shown above 
the VCLT provides no right for suspension or termination in case of obligation erga 
omnes partes. This is yet another indication that obligations in WTO agreements are of 
a collective and not of a bilateral nature.  
  
4.3.2. Enforcement 
When discussing enforcement the question arises, whether a state is entitled to respond 
to a breach by another state, either by way of legal proceeding or by way of 
countermeasures.
215
  
4.3.2.1. Legal standing 
Legal standing concerns the question which state may bring a claim, i.e. which state 
may be complainant in a WTO proceeding before the DSB.
216
 Art. XXIII GATT 94 is 
the central norm for the question under what conditions a state may invoke a Panel 
proceeding. A number of WTO agreements refer to this provision; only a few 
agreements, especially Art. XXIII GATS are formulated differently.  
 
4.3.2.1.1. Art. XXIII GATT 94 
Art. XXIII GATT 94 is formulated rather broadly.
217
 Not only can a member state 
commence a proceeding when any benefit accruing to it is being nullified or impaired, 
but also when the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the 
result of certain conduct by another state. Thus, by its wording the Art. XXIII GATT 94 
is not restricted to the injured state but any party can ensure that other member states 
                                                          
215
 Tams Erga Omnes (2005) 25.  
216
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adhere to the agreement and do not impede the common objective of the parties 
stipulated in the agreements.  
 
Behind the question which state may access the dispute settlement apparatus stand two 
opposing positions. On the one side it could be argued that the DSB serves to uphold the 
balance of interests of the member states as a reciprocal ideal. A member state may 
restore this balance of interest when another member state upsets the equilibrium found 
in the agreements.
218
 Thus, the purpose of the DSB is resolving a particular bilateral 
dispute. Contrary to this legalistic approach, the other side rather relies on the collective 
commitment that the parties have entered into.
219
 The main aspect is the “good faith” of 
the parties to make the agreements work the way they were agreed upon.
220
 While the 
former approach would rather reflect a bilateral understanding the latter could be 
understood as indicating that at least some WTO obligations were meant to be 
collective.  
 
The parties did not resolve this question clearly in one way or the other. Article XXIII 
GATT 94 contains two options, namely that benefits are nullified or impaired but also 
that the objectives of the agreement are impeded. This second option is much more 
objective and speaks in favour of giving the right to bring a case to any member state. It 
might require that a measure by its gravity is able to impede the objectives of the 
agreement. But if this is the case nothing refers to the prerequisite of an adverse effect 
in order to bring a claim. It was thus stated that “a Member’s potential interest in trade 
in goods or services and its interest in a determination of rights and obligations are each 
sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
221
  
 
Unlike other areas of public international law, it is much less to the discretion of the 
defaulting member state to negotiate or agree to a solution but rather upon other 
member states to commence a compulsory DSB proceeding and to enforce it in case of 
                                                          
218
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failure to comply. In comparison to the pre-WTO times the parties cannot veto a panel 
report.
222
 
 
 4.3.2.1.2. DSU 
The GATT 94 which was drafted before existence of the DSB are supplemented by the 
rules of the DSU. Art. 3 DSU stipulates general provisions for a panel proceeding.  
 
The question under what conditions a state may bring a claim before the DSB has been 
discussed a number of times. Especially in the EC – Bananas saga did the EC question 
the jus standi of the US as they hardly produce any Bananas but rather acted in the 
interest of American companies producing Bananas in Latin America. Yet, the GATT 
94 standing is based on the origin of the respective product.
223
  
 
The court allowed the US to be a complainant in the case. The AB ruled that  
“we agree with the panel report that ‘neither Article 3(3) nor 3(7) DSU nor any 
other provision of the DSU contain any explicit requirement that a Member must 
have a ‘legal interest’ as prerequisite for requesting a panel’. We do not accept 
the need for a legal interest is implied in the DSU or in any other WTO 
Agreement.”224  
The passage has been widely criticized for it appearing as no legal interest requirement 
exists with regard to a DSB proceeding. However, more in line with international public 
law it can be understood that no special interest is required but that a general interest of 
any member State is sufficient. To put it differently, a member state may not need to 
show a special legal interest over and above the general interest to ensure adherence of 
the agreements in order to have legal standing to bring a claim before the DSB.
225
 The 
WTO has thus been described as a system of “Judicial Supervision”.226  
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223
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Legal standing is closely connected with the notion of nullification and impairment set 
forth in Art. 3 (8) DSU as well Art. 22 DSU. If a member state resumes to the DSB, 
nullification and impairment is presumed
227
 and if at all rebuttable in fact no state was 
so far able to refute said assumption.
228
 The Appellate Body argued that not the 
expectation on export volumes but the expectations on the competitive relationships 
between imported and domestic products are most important. It thus stated that “[a] 
change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision must consequently be 
regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the 
General Agreement”.229 Even the fact that a measure “has no or insignificant effects 
would [...] not be a sufficient demonstration that the benefits accruing under that 
provision had not been nullified or impaired [...].”230 
 
Yet, the concept of legal standing is broader than the notion of nullification and 
impairment.
231
 The Appellate Body made clear that whenever there is nullification or 
impairment the respective state also has legal standing.
232
 However, the fact that a state 
cannot claim either of the two options does not mean that there is no legal standing.
233
 
Rather, it is upon the members to decide whether to bring a claim or not in order to 
resolve the dispute, in other words whether it is fruitful to access the DSB. 
 
It has been confirmed by the DSB that the parties have a “broad discretion in deciding 
to bring a case against another Member under the DSU.”234 The US could be a claimant 
in the Bananas case although they hardly produce Bananas because it was not necessary 
that US products were affected in order to have legal standing, as confirmed by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body agreed that the potential interest and 
internal market of the US would be sufficient reasons extending legal standing to 
                                                          
227
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virtually any party with regard to any question as indirect effects, especially on the 
internal market can almost never be excluded. The AB pointed out that  
“[...]with the increased interdependence of the global economy [...] any 
deviation from the negotiated balance of rights and obligations is more likely 
than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly”.235  
 
The same holds true with regard to the Havana-Club case.
236
 The EU initiated a Panel 
proceeding although the US measure was not directed against EU but against Cuban 
products. The EU still had an interest, as Havana Club had become a joint venture with 
a French company. However, this fact would not suffice, if viewed in light of the ruling 
by the ICJ in the Barcelona traction case referred to above. In that case, the Court had 
not allowed Belgium to bring a claim against Spain based on the mere fact that Belgium 
nationals were the majority of shareholders of the company, which rights were allegedly 
violated by Spain. The ICJ argued that Belgium would have had jus standi, if 
obligations erga omnes had been involved. If one assumes that the same considerations 
apply with regard to the WTO, it must be concluded that at least some obligations do 
have an erga omnes character. Otherwise it is not explainable, from a general 
international law point of view, that the EU had legal standing in the Havana Club Case. 
Another case were a member state argued with negative trade effects of third countries 
is the US – Line Pipe case in which South Korea argued that a measure violated the 
rights of developing countries without itself being a developing country.
237
  
 
The very fact, that the legal standing in the WTO is not restricted to the injured state, 
leads to the careful assumption that at least some obligations of the WTO agreements 
might not be bilateral but rather have an erga omnes character that allow any state to 
bring a claim in case of their violation if the attainment of the objectives of the 
agreements is impeded.  
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4.3.2.1.3. Art. XXIII GATS 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) formulates its own provision on 
access to the DSB. Art. XXIII GATS states 
“If any Member should consider that any other Member fails to carry out its 
obligations or specific commitments under this Agreement, it may with a view to 
reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter have recourse to the 
DSU”. 
This provision has been understood as to proof that all GATS provisions are collective 
in nature or at least that the consequences of collective obligations are attached to the 
services obligations as any state may bring a claim in case of a violation.
238
 It is 
submitted that it is difficult to argue that the nature of GATS obligation is bilateral but 
that the consequences attached to it are those of erga omnes partes obligations. Rather, 
the notion of legal standing is indicative for the legal nature of an obligation of a treaty.  
 
The legal standing regarding the violation of a GATS obligation is even broader than 
Art. XXIII GATT 94. It was noticed that the legal standing of the US in the Bananas 
case with regard to GATS was not even questioned.
239
 Adlung and Morrison stress the 
higher degree of linkage of GATS obligations due to the different modes of services 
explaining why any member has legal standing with regard to GATS obligations. The 
legal standing of the GATS is thus a strong indication that all GATS obligations are 
indeed erga omnes partes obligations. Yet, the individual determination of its 
obligations will have to take place on the third level.
240
  
 
4.3.2.2. Countermeasures 
Firstly, it should be stressed that even in general international public law regarding well 
accepted erga omnes obligations it is highly contested whether these obligations allow 
the recourse to collective sanctions.
241
 Although Tams after considering a number of 
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cases concludes that collective sanctions are permitted in case of erga omnes violations 
a number of authors are of the opinion that in general only an injured state may have the 
right to impose countermeasures.
242
  
 
The WTO allows two different kinds of countermeasures that should be distinguished, 
namely in the bilateral and in the multilateral track. Either a member state may impose 
countermeasures in the form of anti-dumping or countervailing duties due to an injury 
that incurred to him or it may impose countermeasures in case of non-compliance with 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The difference of the basis is important: 
in the first scenario the state acts in its individual capacity while in the second scenario 
the state enforces a ruling after objectively a violation of an obligation was confirmed 
by the DSB. While in the first case the state acts on its own behalf in the latter case the 
DSB had already determined that the conduct of the state was not in conformity with the 
member states’ WTO obligations.  
 
In the bilateral track not every state may impose countermeasures. Rather, 
countervailing as well as Anti-Dumping duties require the state wanting to impose 
countermeasures to have suffered an injury.
243
 It is in this regard irrelevant whether a 
duty is imposed as response to prohibited or actionable subsidies or dumped products. 
However, it is limited to the amount suffered by the unlawful measure of the other 
member state.  
 
At first, the same understanding might be underlying the multilateral track as Art. 22 (6) 
DSU requires “that the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification 
or impairment”. This could lead to the assumption that the suspension must be 
equivalent to the injury suffered by the member state intending to impose the 
countermeasure. In other words, a member state may only suspend concession if it has 
suffered an injury as otherwise it could never suspend concession that are equivalent to 
the nullification or impairment. The system has been described by the Arbitrator in 
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Brazil – Aircraft that “these countermeasures aim at eliminating the adverse effects of 
measures on trade of a given Member”.244  
 
However, this statement is not unproblematic as it has been stressed several times that 
object and purpose of the right to countermeasures is to induce compliance.
245
 It aims at 
restoring the balance of rights and obligations among the member states.
246
 Most 
importantly, the right to countermeasures is not meant to be understood in a punitive 
manner.
247
 Thus, the restriction to the equivalent amount is first and foremost the 
prohibition on punitive countermeasures or compensation. It shall only serve the 
purpose to induce future compliance with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB. 
It is directed at bringing into conformity measures that violated the WTO agreements. 
This understanding opens the door towards not restricting the right to countermeasures 
solely to an injured state. Indeed, different constellations need to be distinguished. 
 
For example, Art. 4 and 7 SCM are lex specialis in relation to the DSU with regard to 
prohibited and actionable subsidies.
248
 Remarkably, while Art. 7.9 SCM similarly to 
Art. 22(6) DSU, provides for countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and 
nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, such connection to the injury cannot be 
found in Art. 4 SCM. Rather, Art. 4.10 SCM reads that  
“the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take 
appropriate
9
 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject 
the request.” [emphasis added] 
(footnote original) 
9
 This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that 
are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these 
provisions are prohibited. 
This provision does not require the equivalence of nullification and impairment or an 
injury but allows appropriate countermeasures. In the US – FSC proceeding the 
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arbitrator granted the EC the right to countermeasures as a response to prohibited 
subsidies not in the amount equal to their share of the market but in the amount roughly 
equivalent to the total value of the subsidies unlawfully granted by the US.
249
  
 
Beyond the case of prohibited subsidies, member states were allowed to impose 
countermeasures although the nullification and impairment of their rights was difficult 
to determine. In EC-Bananas III – in which case already the legal standing of the US 
was questioned since they hardly produce any Bananas – it could have been expected 
that the US would at least not have been allowed to suspend concessions as not the US 
but only American companies had suffered any injuries. Yet, the arbitrator did allow the 
suspension of concessions in the – rather randomly determined – amount of 191 million 
US dollars. The arbitrator based its argument on a potential trade share and import 
licences, totally ignoring the fact that the US did not in reality produce any Bananas and 
that other producers would also gain a bigger world share in case of opening of the EC 
market. The arbitrator argued 
“Rather, the task is reduced to working out the differences between the two 
scenarios in (a) the US share of wholesale trade services in bananas sold in the 
European Communities and (b) the US share of allocated banana import licences 
from which quota rents accrue. Using the various data provided on US market 
shares, and our knowledge of the current quota allocation and what we estimate 
it would be under the WTO-consistent counterfactual chosen by us, we 
determine that the level of nullification and impairment is US$191.4 million per 
year”.250 
 
This ruling is in line with the object and purpose of the DSU, namely to induce 
compliance. It may be less relevant to what extend the individual member was injured if 
it is assumed that the inconsistency of a measure has caused nullification and 
impairment to any member state and thus to the WTO system as whole. It can be 
assumed that there was a WTO inconsistency and that this has presumably caused 
nullification or impairment to member states. The member state does not act on behalf 
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of other member states but on the fact that a panel found an inconsistency that the 
complaining member state now has the right to enforce. Of course not any member 
could impose countermeasures but only a complaining member holding the DSB ruling 
in its favour in its hands.  
 
However, often the problem of multiparty proceedings is expounded.
251
 It is argued that 
only if the right to suspend concession is strictly mirrored by the nullification and 
impairment criteria may this guarantee that several complainants will not overstretch the 
overall right to countermeasures.  
Yet, Gazzini rightly points out that  
“the crux of the matter is the total of the authorized counter-measures the sum of 
which must be appropriate in the sense that they are expected effectively to 
induce compliance”.252  
It is important to determine what the overall allowance should be for all complainants 
and then appoint an appropriate share to that complainant invoking a proceeding under 
Art. 22(6) DSU. It would not even be against the spirit of Art. 22 DSU to allow this 
member State to suspend concession in the overall amount and require all other 
complaining parties to request their right from the first complaining member state 
approaching Art. 22(6) DSU. In fact, Art. 22(4) DSU which refers to the equivalence of 
suspension and nullification and impairment does not state that the authorization is 
restricted to the nullification and impairment of the state requesting the authorization. It 
could also be understood as to prohibit suspension more than the overall nullification 
and impairment. This would suffice to guarantee that countermeasures are not abused 
for compensation or in a punitive manner.  
 
If the main reason for the right to countermeasures is the insurance of compliance and 
the enforcement of WTO conform behaviour of a certain member state it is less relevant 
which member state exactly suspends the concession as long as the violating member 
state is instigated to bringing its measures into conformity. This is also not an unjust or 
dangerous suggestion as it is totally up to the member state in breach of its obligations 
to immediately end the suspension of concession by complying with the ruling. Due to 
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the fact that the Appellate Body allowed legal standing to virtually any member State it 
is only consequent if any complainant may also be able to enforce the ruling. Otherwise, 
it would be risked that the dispute settlement mechanism evolved into a two class 
system in which better complainants could enforce a ruling while other, although 
winning the case, could only sit and watch the unduly behaviour of the responding state. 
 
This finding is line with Art. 54 ASR. According to this provision a state other than the 
injured state may take lawful countermeasures. The WTO itself states that “the 
complainant is thus allowed to impose countermeasures that would otherwise be 
inconsistent with the WTO Agreements, in response to a violation or to non-violation 
nullification or impairment.”253 The DSB thus allows the measures by a state that is not 
injured, enabling this state to take up lawful countermeasures in the sense of Art. 54 
ASR. There exists even an expressive reference in the DSU that indicates that the 
member states thought about collectively enforcement of rulings of the DSB.
254
 
According to Art. 21(6) DSU  
“[T]he issue of implementation of recommendations or rulings may be raised at 
the DSB by any Member at any time following their adoption.”  
This part of the provision that has hardly been noticed and did not play any relevance in 
practice as of yet lifts implementation out of the purely bilateral relation and makes it an 
issue of all member states.  
While in the bilateral track the right to countermeasures is restricted to the injured state 
this does not hold true with regard to the multilateral track. Rather, the right to 
countermeasures mirrors the fact that a member state was complainant in a proceeding. 
In this case, a member state may suspend concessions and other obligations. Yet, no 
member state shall be authorized to impose countermeasures over the total amount of 
possible nullifications and impairment of all member states taken together.
255
 
 
To sum up the second stage, the procedural design of the WTO, regarding reservations 
and modifications as well as legal standing and the right to countermeasures rather 
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mirror those rules that in general international are attached to collective obligations. 
That implies that some if not all WTO obligations were meant to be collective. 
  
4.4. Step 3: Exemplary core norms of different legal nature in WTO 
On the third level the legal nature of individual obligations can be determined. It has 
been observed that the WTO protects collective interests and that the procedural design 
leads towards finding that at least some obligations have an erga omnes character. But 
which norms are bilateral and which collective? When determining the legal nature of 
WTO obligations on the third level, it will be revealed that not all obligations share the 
same features. While some norms clearly reveal an erga omnes character, other norms 
due to their material prerequisites have a bilateral character while other important norms 
might be more ambiguous.  
 
4.4.1. Erga omnes partes obligations   
On the one side of the spectrum are erga omnes partes obligations in the WTO 
agreements. These norms indeed feature the characteristic of erga omnes obligations, 
namely they protect a collective interest, they do not require a member state to be 
adversely affected in order to invoke their violation and they may thus be enforced by 
any member state.  
     
4.4.1.1. Prohibited subsidies 
Art. 3 SCM can be named as a clear example of a WTO norm with an erga omnes 
character. It sets forth that export and import substitution subsidies shall be prohibited. 
The drafters of the SCM agreed that these two types of subsidies generally cause 
adverse effect and disturb the market. They thus did not make the invocation of this 
norm dependent on an adverse effect of the member state claiming a violation. Rather, 
there is an assumption that such subsidy has caused adverse effects and that the balance 
of interest of the member states was upset.
256
 Hence, the wording prohibits these kinds 
of subsidies as a matter of principle. This objective wording without any reference to an 
adverse effect of a member State led the Arbitrators in the US-FSC case to argue that  
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“Other Members are not obliged to make a case regarding the adverse effects to 
successfully challenge such measures. They are required simply to establish the 
existence of a measure that is, as a matter of principle, expressly prohibited. As 
an empirical matter they undoubtedly do have adverse effects. But that is not the 
legal basis upon which action may be taken to challenge them under the SCM 
Agreement.”257  
That is to say that in the next paragraph the arbitrator, with regard to the legal nature of 
Art. 3 SCM argues  
 “It is an erga omnes obligation owed in its entirety to each and every Member. 
It cannot be considered to be "allocatable" across the Membership. Otherwise, 
the Member concerned would be only partially obliged in respect of each and 
every Member, which is manifestly inconsistent with an erga omnes per se 
obligation. Thus, the US has breached its obligation to the EC in respect of all 
the money that it has expended, because such expenditure in breach – the 
expense incurred – is the very essence of the wrongful act.”258 
Yet, regarding the right to countermeasures it should be noticed that the Arbitrator in 
this proceeding referred to Article 49 ASR and the right to countermeasures of an 
injured state.
259
 However, the EU was in fact injured by the subsidies. This confirms the 
view that an erga omnes obligation may also be found where a violation may at the 
same time injure one or a number of states particularly. 
 
Horn and Mavroidis do not share this view.
260
 They argue that also Art. 3 SCM is based 
on the consideration that the subsidy confers competitive advantage. Thus, this 
provision protects the individual interests of certain member states, only – in 
comparison to Art. 5 and 6 SCM – the adverse effect is assumed. Yet, that the provision 
at the same time protects individual interests does not proof that it does not also protect 
the common interest of the member states, to in this regard trade on a market that is not 
                                                          
257
 US – FSC (2002) (Article 22.6 Arbitration) Rn. 5.39; similarly in Canada – Aircraft (2000) 
WT/DS222/ARB Rn. 3.29. 
258
 US – FSC (2002) (Art. 22.6 Arbitration) para. 6.10; Horn & Mavroidis (eds) rightly point out that it is 
flawed if the Arbitrator refers to erga omnes obligations as the obligation not to provide prohibited to the 
community as a whole but to all WTO member states; it should correctly be referred to erga omnes partes 
norms The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law (2007) 356 [hereinafter Horn & 
Mavroidis WTO Case Law] 
259
 US – FSC (2002) (Art. 22.6 Arbitration)  para. 5.60. 
260
 Horn & Mavroidis WTO Case Law (2007) 356 
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distorted by export and import substitution subsidies that “are specifically designed to 
affect trade”.261 It has been found that – even absent a Preamble – the very object and 
purpose of the SCM is prohibiting the distortion of international trade.
262
 The US-FSC 
Arbitrator rightly pointed out that the member states have “have a ‘right’ to expect that 
there will be no export subsidies applied to those goods covered by the SCM 
Agreement” corresponding with the obligation of the other member states to refraining 
from applying such kind of subsidies.
263
 The common interest of the member states is 
the establishment of a fair and undistorted market. This finding is supported by the right 
to appropriate countermeasures provided in Art. 4.10 SCM.  
   
4.4.1.2. Trade in services obligations 
It has been opined that the same consideration can be applied to all obligations under 
GATS, because Art. XXIII GATS does not require the member state to have suffered 
any injury, but only that objectively “a Member has failed to carry out its obligation”. 
Adlung argues that “the purely bilateral nature of trade in services is much less evident” 
because in trade in services the different modes of supply tend to feature a higher degree 
of linkage among the member states than in case of goods.
264
  
 
Yet, obligations are not more or less evidently bilateral but either bilateral or collective 
in nature. The preamble of the GATS Agreements formulates the collective interest of 
the member states:  
“Recognizing the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and 
development of the world economy; 
“Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade 
in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the 
economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing 
countries”265 
                                                          
261
 Brazil — Aircraft (1999) WT/DS46/R para. 7.26. 
262
 Brazil — Aircraft (1999) WT/DS46/R para. 7.26; Canada — Aircraft (1999) WT/DS70/R para. 9.119. 
263
 US – FSC (2002) (Article 22.6 Arbitration) para. 6.7.  
264
 Adlung & Morrison Less Than The GATS (2010) 1124.  
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 GATS Preamble first and second  recital.  
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The preamble is focused on the expansion of trade in services and the establishment of 
principles and rules. In comparison to the GATT 94 it does not speak of reciprocal 
agreements but rather of the increase in trade in services, transparency and progressive 
liberalisation aiming at promoting economic growth of all trading partners. Special 
attention is given to developing countries.
266
 Also, the legal standing is a strong 
indication that indeed the drafters wanted the obligations in services to be understood as 
erga omnes partes obligations.
267
 But what does that mean with regard to the individual 
obligations? Step 1 and 2 can only guide but never entirely anticipate the result of the 
third step, namely the analysis of the individual obligations in the WTO agreements.  
 
The GATS obligations run parallel with a number of GATT 94 obligations, most 
importantly MFN and National Treatment (NT). It is unique for example with regard to 
requiring transparency, Art. III GATS. Yet, most obligations are determined by the 
individual schedules committed by the member states. Especially those core norms such 
as MFN and NT may be found to have an erga omnes character, as will be shown for 
the GATT Agreement further below. They reflect the common interest of the member 
states to treat all member states equally and to build an international trading system 
without discrimination among the market participants, especially in the services sector. 
This obligation is not only owed towards each member state individually but rather – as 
it is stated in Art. I GATS – towards all member states of the GATS treaty. This is 
exactly confirmed by Art. XXIII GATS that gives every member state the possibility to 
challenge behaviour that is not in conformity with the services agreement.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that at least those core obligations under GATS that reflect 
the collective interest of the member states are obligations erga omnes partes.  
 
4.4.2. Bilateral obligations 
On the other side of the spectrum are norms that have a clear bilateral character. What 
makes these obligations bilateral is the fact that they require the claiming party to have 
been adversely effected. Yet, an obligation can never be regarded as to have an erga 
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 Especially in recital 5 and 6 of the Preamble.  
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 Gazzini The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations (2006) 731.  
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omnes character if – in its material prerequisites – the norm requires the claimant state 
to have suffered an injury. This is due to the fact that the complaining member cannot 
rely on another member states injury leading to the conclusion that the obligation is 
owed towards each and every member state individually. 
 
4.4.2.1. Actionable subsidies 
For example, Art. 5 and 6 SCM require a state to proof before the DSB that an adverse 
effect was caused by the subsidy. In US-Upland Cotton Benin and Chad – although not 
a claimant in the proceeding between Brazil and USA – argued that their adverse effect 
of the subsidization of the Cotton industry by the US should also be taken into 
consideration. They argued that Art. 5 SCM is “an obligation on behalf of the 
subsidizing Member not to cause adverse effects to the interests of all WTO Members – 
not just the complaining Member. [emphasis added]”268 The Panel did not accept this 
line of argumentation. Although Art. 5 SCM refers to “Members”, i.e. the plural, the 
Panel in US-Upland Cotton stressed that the more precise text of Art. 6.3. SCM refers to 
“another member”. 269 The Panel argued that taking into consideration Benin’s and 
Chad’s adverse effect would alter the terms of the provision.  
 
Especially, Art. 7 SCM supports this line of argumentation. In comparison to prohibited 
subsidies that are per se prohibited and thus must be withdrawn, Art. 7 suggest the 
removal of the adverse effect or the withdrawal of the measure. Thus the lawfulness of 
the subsidy depends exclusively on the member state claiming to have suffered adverse 
effect. Similarly, Art. 7.9 SCM does not allow appropriate countermeasures such as Art. 
4.10 SCM but countermeasures “commensurate with the degree and nature of the 
adverse effect determined to exist”.  
 
It is thus a bilateral obligation not to cause adverse effect to another member state 
individually by actionable subsidies. 
  
                                                          
268
 US - Upland Cotton (2004) para. 7.1400. 
269
 US - Upland Cotton (2004) para. 7.1400. 
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4.4.2.2. Dumping 
The same holds true with regard to Anti-Dumping measures, where the member State 
wishing to impose an anti-dumping duty has to have suffered an injury itself. It would 
not suffice that any member state has suffered an injury because Art. VI GATT 94 in its 
wording refers to the member state that is imposing the anti-dumping duty. In this 
regard Art. VI GATT 94 states that  
“The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one 
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the 
normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens 
material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or 
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry”.  
The Anti-Dumping Agreement (AD) lacks a preamble. Neither the Panel nor the 
Appellate Body have made statements regarding a general object and purpose of the AD 
except that one of the ‘objectives’ of the agreement is “providing a multilaterally agreed 
framework of rules governing actions against injurious dumping”.270 This supports the 
assumption that the Anti-Dumping does protect a common interest of the member 
states, but to a lesser extent than the SCM with regard to export and import substitution 
subsidies. It rather protects the individual interest of the member states not to be injured 
by way of dumped products imported into their respective markets, which is in this 
sense a common interest but not over and above what the agreement is supposed to 
protect in the interest of the individual member.  
 
To sum up, where a norm includes as a prerequisite that an adverse effect has been 
suffered by that member state, the norm is of a bilateral character.  
 
4.4.3. Ambiguous Norms 
There are a number of clauses that are interpreted as bilateral or collective by different 
authors and can thus be considered to be ‘ambiguous’ norms. As not all WTO norms 
can be observed here, the focus is on core obligations of the WTO agreements, 
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 United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Review (Zeroing – Japan) (US v. Japan) 
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especially MFN and NT. This section shall also briefly touch upon obligations in other 
agreements that have not yet been examined by other authors.  
 
4.4.3.1. MFN 
The clearest indication for a bilateral obligation, in Pauwelyn’s view, is the MFN clause 
itself, Art. I GATT 94. The MFN function on the basis that  
“With respect to customs duties and charges [...] any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.”271  
Pauwelyn emphasizes that commitments that are often negotiated bilaterally have to be 
extended to other member states. Thus, there are no common commitments but only 
commitments extended to every member state.
272
 It is true that the mechanism of the 
MNF clause works via a bilateral relation. Through concessions provided to one 
member state other member states gain the right to require the member state to treat 
them equally. Yet, this mechanism does not proof that the obligation is not collective.  
 
An erga omnes partes obligation is an obligation owed to the members of a treaty as a 
whole due to the fact that the obligation protects the collective interest of its member 
states. What collective interest does the MFN protect? Basically, that all member states 
treat and are in fact treated alike. The preamble of the GATT 94 clearly states that it 
aims at “the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce”. The 
MFN is an expression of this very goal that – although referring to the product – all 
member states are treated equally and it is in fact a cornerstone of the multilateral 
trading system.  
 
Of course, one could argue that if state X has to grant any advantage to state A and 
subsequently to state B and C, it is a subsequent and individual obligation towards states 
B and C. However, this view does not appropriately take into consideration that the 
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 Art. I GATT 94.  
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MFN is formulated as an obligation towards all member states. The norm was not 
formulated in a bilateral way, namely that the respective treatment shall be accorded to 
each and every member state. Rather, the wording refers to all contracting parties 
thereby giving it a rather collective character. 
 
Thus, every member state owes to all the parties of the WTO the obligation to in fact 
apply the privileges it grants to one member State to all products from any State, not 
even restricted to the point in time when the agreement came into force, but any time 
when a member state starts trading in the respective product. This general obligation 
towards the WTO community is violated if a state for example would pass a law in 
which it would carve out a number of states from the MFN treatment, granting 
privileges to products from only 89% of the member states. The member state would 
not only violate the MFN ‘as applied’ but implicitly declare that it does not respect the 
MFN ‘as such’. This would in fact be a breach that would enable any state to start a 
proceeding against this state, as it would – in line with Art. XXIII GATT 94 – impede 
the attainment of the goal of the WTO, namely that all member states treat all other 
member states alike. It would violate the collective interest of the member state and 
would jeopardize the balance of interest of the member states found in the agreements. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the MFN is an erga omnes partes obligation.  
 
4.4.3.2. NT 
Similar considerations apply to NT. The wording of Art. III.2 GATT 94 might appear 
more bilateral than the MFN provision. It reads 
“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to 
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” 
Although, the wording of the provision on NT is thus rather bilateral the obligation is 
similarly an expression of the parties will to eliminate discrimination between imported 
and domestic products. If NT is not granted a member may be able to seal off its market 
if it were to apply taxes or other charges that would disadvantage foreign products to be 
established on the market. Due to the fact that non-discrimination is one of the major 
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objects and purposes of the WTO, a member state would impede the attainment of the 
objective of the agreements. Thus, any member state would be able to rely on Art. 
XXIII GATT 94 and invoke a violation of Art. III GATT 94 even without being 
affected by an “as such” measure of another member. Thus, the NT obligation is also 
enforceable by any member state. These arguments speak in favour of considering NT 
to have erga omnes partes character.  
 
4.4.3.3. Obligations in other Agreements 
Another example is the Agriculture Agreement. The strong language of the Preamble 
reveals the interest in the parties to commonly regulate the Agriculture Sector. 
However, from the drafting history we know that the interests are not very common and 
that hardly any agreement was as disputed as the Agriculture Agreement. The 
obligations that reflect the SCM regarding subsidies might be resolved in the same way 
as with regard to the AA, namely when the material prerequisites require to be 
adversely affected the obligations are bilateral. The procedural design does not feature 
any particularities, apart from the standstill clause in Art. 13 AA which has however 
elapsed in 2003. Otherwise the obligations, due to the interests of protecting developing 
countries and food security in the world indicate their rather collective nature and thus 
have an erga omnes partes character.  
 
Another agreement that might appear ambiguous is the TBT. The preamble stresses the 
importance of international accepted standards for the international trade.
273
 The core 
obligation, Art. 2.2 TBT states that it  
“[S]hall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of 
the risks non-fulfilment would create.” 
This provision does not require a state to be adversely affected but rather is an objective 
regulation that technical barriers may not lead to obstacles to trade. It is very convincing 
if a party would argue that legislation adopted by a member state violates this principal 
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obligation even without it facing any obstacles to its trade at present. Thus, Art. 2.2. 
TBT is also an erga omnes partes obligation.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
To sum up, when applying the three step approach in order to determine the nature of 
WTO obligations it needs to be referred to aspects such as the object and purpose of the 
agreement and the procedural design in order to understand the overall will of the 
parties. It was shown that the WTO agreements protect collective interests and that the 
procedural design mirrors that of obligations erga omnes partes, making it reasonable to 
assume that at least some obligations are in fact of an erga omnes partes nature.  
 
When considering particular obligations especially the question whether the obligation 
protects one of the objects and purposes of the agreement and the wording needs to be 
taken into consideration. It has been found that some obligations in the WTO are of an 
erga omnes partes nature, e.g. Art. 3 SCM and obligations in trade in services.  Other 
obligations, especially due to the fact that the norm in its material prerequisites requires 
the member state to be adversely affected indicates that these obligations are of a 
bilateral nature. Further, it has been argued that other core norms, such as MFN and NT 
are also of an erga omnes partes nature as these norms protect the very object and 
purpose of the WTO agreements, namely non-discrimination and equal treatment 
among member states.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The thesis presented the distinction between bilateral and collective obligations in 
international law. It explained the roots of the distinction as well as the consequences 
that follow from it. The categories have especially found way into the VCLT and the 
ASR with regard to aspects such as reservations, modification of treaties, suspension 
and termination, legal standing and countermeasures. Generally speaking it can be said 
that bilateral obligations within a multilateral treaty are to a much greater extent 
dependent on the discretion of a pair of states because the multilateral treaty works as a 
bundle of bilateral obligations. Thus, the parties may alter and enforce these obligations 
in their bilateral relationship. On the contrary, collective obligations protect a collective 
interest of the parties and thus the parties are to a much lesser extent free to alter the 
obligations. At the same time, all parties have an interest in enforcing the treaty 
obligations in order to bring into effect the collective interest of the parties.  
 
From this follows the question how the legal nature of obligations in international law 
can be determined in general in order to being able to determine the legal nature of 
WTO obligations in particular. It was established that to date no coherent and 
systematic approach to this question had been developed. While the ICJ has for the first 
time found obligations in a treaty to be of an erga omnes partes nature in 2012 its 
approach has been criticised by a number of Judges. The same holds true with regard to 
those academics that have commented on the WTO obligations so far. Although 
displaying a number of good arguments, their approaches are unsystematic.  
 
Therefore, a three step approach has been developed and presented. On the first step, it 
needs to be examined whether a treaty protects collective interests by way of referring 
to preambles, ministerial declarations and jurisprudence. On the second step, the 
procedural design of a treaty needs to be understood in order to understand the parties 
overall will. Aspects that in general international public law reflect the understanding of 
bilateral and collective obligations need to be analysed, namely altering and enforcing 
treaty obligations. On the third step individual obligations can be determined by way of 
examining whether the norm protects a collective interest, can be collectively enforced 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
and features bilateral or collective language and requirements.  The three step approach 
allows determining the legal nature of any treaty obligation in international law.  
 
This approach has been applied to the WTO and it has been shown that the WTO 
agreements protect collective interests. The procedural design, rather mirroring 
collective features such as the broad legal standing before the DSB, led to the 
assumption that at least some WTO obligations are to be understood as having an erga 
omnes partes nature. Afterwards individual obligations were examined in detail. Indeed 
and confirmed by WTO case law, some WTO obligations have an erga omnes partes 
nature due to inter alia their very clear wording and their object and purpose of 
protecting collective interests. Yet, others are clearly of a bilateral character if they 
require that a state has suffered an adverse effect as a material prerequisite. Other norms 
are more ambiguous. In this case, a norm that can be found to have an erga omnes 
character if it protects a collective interest and if its violation impedes the attainment of 
the objectives of the WTO agreements. In this case the obligation is owed towards all 
the member states and any state may bring a claim against the other member state 
breaching its obligations. This led to the understanding that the WTO agreements 
consist of obligations with different legal nature.   
 
What follows from all this in practice? First of all, in case of lacunae of the WTO – due 
to being able to determine the legal nature by way of the three step approach – it can be 
determined whether the regime for erga omnes partes or bilateral norms of the VCLT 
and the ASR need to be applied.  
 
But over and above and maybe more importantly, this work revealed that collective 
interests are protected by the WTO agreements in general and with regard to certain 
obligations, such as prohibited subsidies and MFN, in particular, leading to regarding 
these norms as erga omnes partes norms. This means that the obligation is owed 
towards all members of the WTO. In case of a breach any member is indeed in a 
position to enforce said obligation, just like Belgium did against Senegal with regard to 
the Genocide Convention. In the past, due to the design of the DSU especially with 
regard to remedies it has proven difficult for developing countries to bring a dispute 
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before the DSB. Apprehending the erga omnes partes nature of WTO obligations will 
lead towards a better chance of enforcing WTO obligations in the interest of the WTO 
community, for example with regard to prohibited subsidies that are applied by 
industrialised countries on a large scale but are not challenged because developing 
countries do not see themselves in a position to initiate a proceeding. Why shall not 
other states challenge these subsidies in the interest of developing countries, just like 
Belgium challenged Senegal’s conduct in the interests of the community to have 
Hissène Habré prosecuted or extradited? It is submitted that – although the cases are 
completely different – the enforcement is not at all less important with regard to WTO 
obligations. For the people living in developing countries to face fewer subsidies on the 
world market or to gain better market access can have a much greater impact on the 
level of everyday life and can lead to making a step forward towards development, 
especially in Africa.  
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